Dowell logically aligned with the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. It specifically aligned itself with the equal protection principles outlined in the Amendment. The District Court’s ruling to terminate the injunction and then later the decree were perfectly logical. The injunction had started in 1972 and by 1977 the school had desegregated the school by the government’s standards. Over the five years, the school changed enough that the government had claimed the district had achieved “unitary” status and desegregation was complete. Therefore, the case was rightfully terminated. These injunctions and decrees were not meant to be a sword forever hanging over a school district’s head. The intention of the desegregation injunctions and decrees were to guide school districts towards a more inclusive school environment and hold them accountable for this transition for a more equal schooling experience. When the SRP was initiated, the District Court could not reopen the case because legally a matter that has previously been solved in court cannot be pursued by the same parties again (Res judicata). Furthermore, there was no need to take the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals’ findings ultimately violated the equal protection principles outlined in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution gives person’s within the territories of the United States protection from the laws of the country. The injunction and decree were fair for a certain period of time, but once the district had reached “unitary” status, it was no longer necessary. The Court of Appeals’ decision was unnecessarily strict surpassing the decree and the injunction’s severity to begin with. The decision also surpassed the severity of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The ruling of the Court of Appeals was far too strict; therefore, it violated the
Dowell logically aligned with the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. It specifically aligned itself with the equal protection principles outlined in the Amendment. The District Court’s ruling to terminate the injunction and then later the decree were perfectly logical. The injunction had started in 1972 and by 1977 the school had desegregated the school by the government’s standards. Over the five years, the school changed enough that the government had claimed the district had achieved “unitary” status and desegregation was complete. Therefore, the case was rightfully terminated. These injunctions and decrees were not meant to be a sword forever hanging over a school district’s head. The intention of the desegregation injunctions and decrees were to guide school districts towards a more inclusive school environment and hold them accountable for this transition for a more equal schooling experience. When the SRP was initiated, the District Court could not reopen the case because legally a matter that has previously been solved in court cannot be pursued by the same parties again (Res judicata). Furthermore, there was no need to take the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals’ findings ultimately violated the equal protection principles outlined in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution gives person’s within the territories of the United States protection from the laws of the country. The injunction and decree were fair for a certain period of time, but once the district had reached “unitary” status, it was no longer necessary. The Court of Appeals’ decision was unnecessarily strict surpassing the decree and the injunction’s severity to begin with. The decision also surpassed the severity of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The ruling of the Court of Appeals was far too strict; therefore, it violated the