The most notable objection I present is the argument that I do not believe Socrates can justify the claim that people with just souls are practically just. An individual with a just soul, to be pragmatically just, must refrain from unjust actions, and it must be that the actions they perform are done so because it is required by justice. Socrates must be able to prove that people with just souls will satisfy both claims. Socrates defends his definition regarding the first claim by citing several examples, stating that a person with a just soul would be chosen to perform duties that could easily be taken advantage of, and would not betray his fellow citizens (442e-443a). Socrates does not present a thorough argument as to why those with just souls would never act in pragmatically unjust manner, but at least references why he does not believe they would. With regards to the issue of individuals with just souls behaving in a just manner because it is required by justice, Socrates does not specifically address this concern. Socrates himself states that philosopher kings must be compelled to rule (473d), and even though they are just, and ruling is the just action to perform, they would not perform the act of ruling even though justice requires it. It would seem implied, based on Socrates definition of justice, that philosopher kings, given their just souls, would want to rule …show more content…
Since philosophers have the best judgement, as we previously argued, then it must be that the characteristic pleasure of philosophers in the best pleasure (582-583). This line of reasoning in unsatisfactory, however, since it does not definitively prove why the philosopher believes their pleasure is the best pleasure, and why the distinction in pleasures is made. Socrates refutes these objections by arguing that the characteristic pleasures of money lovers and honor lovers are considered pleasures because they fill a bodily pleasure that would be painful if unfulfilled, while the philosopher’s characteristic pleasure do not fill a painful deficit, and thus must be more genuine that other pleasures