Despite the spread of communism in Latin America being directly linked to the Cuban Missile Crisis, added to the obvious fear and caution in the form of relations adopted by America with Latin American countries, international relations did not include direct conflict. Containment in Latin America involved virtually no direct conflict whatsoever, and this was largely due to the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the case of Cuba, the State Department policy planning council explained: "The primary danger we face in Castro is … in the impact the very existence of his regime has upon the leftist movement in many Latin American countries … The simple fact is that Castro represents a successful defiance of the US, a negation of our whole hemispheric policy of almost a century and a half.” The disaster that was the CIA-led force of anti-Castro rebels at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 characterised a major victory to be used as communist Cuban propaganda. Khrushchev agreed to install medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. The crisis was resolved by removing the missiles in return for an American pledge not to invade the island, and for the removal of American missiles in Turkey. However, this agreement was not entirely upheld, with the US continuing to …show more content…
foreign policy in Latin America after 1959 prioritised the immediate halt of communism spreading, and this was summarised in three clear and targeted words: no more Cubas. To achieve this goal, the USA used a dual pronged approach in Latin America: foreign assistance to encourage modernisation and economic development so to make communism less appealing to the population of under-developed countries, and the training and arming of Latin American militaries whom supported the objectives of the United States. Nixon followed this approach in many of his actions throughout the Cold War, along with the support of Henry Kissinger. In 1977, the Torrijos-Carter Treaties were signed between the U.S. and Panama, which handed back control of the Panama Canal to the Panamanian government, which of course greatly improved the country’s economic prospects. After a decade of minimal economic aid to Latin America, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations pumped in twenty billion dollars of economic assistance, which was donated by large multinational corporations. The Alliance for Progress did contribute to per capita economic growth for most nations during the 1960s, but meaningful social and agrarian reforms proved elusive in most areas. However, this does not mean that the Alliance did not have it’s successes, with illiteracy rates plummeting and long-term improvements began to be seen within some administrations due to the continued good work of Teodoro Moscoso after