Because prisons are extremely labor intensive, with approximately 65 to 70 percent of the costs of operating a prison going to staff salaries according to a Global Investment and Business Center report, reducing expenditures associated with operational costs would in turn lead to a more cost effective operation. This is possible as private firms typically use cheaper nonunion labor. The Adler School Institute on Public Safety and Social Justice reveals that the average private prison employee receives 58 fewer hours of training when compared to those from the public sector.They also suggests that lower staff levels and training at private facilities may lead to increases in incidences of violence and escapes. As a result, the increased emphasis
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A conflict of interest, thus, arises on the part of privately run prisons where they, in theory, are incentivized to hold prisoners. This is most evident with facilities that function with quotas outlined within their contracts. According to an In the Public Interest report, 65 percent of the private prison contracts examined included an occupancy clause in which the private prisons would need to guarantee 80% to 100% occupancy for their facilities. The states with the highest occupancy requirements are Arizona, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Virginia with quotas requiring between 95% and 100% …show more content…
In essence, the profit incentive, or rather the profit motive behind privatizing prisons, provides a rather counterintuitive approach to criminal justice. Instead of reducing the need for incarceration, for profit prison’s incentivizes the demand for it. Doing so undermines several facets of a viable prison system seeking to reintegrate inmates as productive citizens. According to a Justice Policy Institute report, direct campaign contributions, networking, and lobbying account for the private prison industry’s strategy towards legislative influence. Despite CCA’s financial annual report to the U.S. Securities and Exchange commission in 2012 claiming disengagement with lobbying for criminal legislation, Carl Takei ,a staff attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union National Prison Project wrote in 2011 that CCA allocated $710,300 for political contributions to federal and state office candidates, political action campaigns, and political parties.Through discreet funding, corporations like CCA and the GEO Group gain access to local, state, and federal policymakers as they help elect favorable officials.This is evident with increased contributions to state politicians , where 2010 in relation to previous election cycles since 2000, as reported by the 2011 Justice Policy Institute report, marked the largest contribution to state politicians. Consequently , according
A conflict of interest, thus, arises on the part of privately run prisons where they, in theory, are incentivized to hold prisoners. This is most evident with facilities that function with quotas outlined within their contracts. According to an In the Public Interest report, 65 percent of the private prison contracts examined included an occupancy clause in which the private prisons would need to guarantee 80% to 100% occupancy for their facilities. The states with the highest occupancy requirements are Arizona, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Virginia with quotas requiring between 95% and 100% …show more content…
In essence, the profit incentive, or rather the profit motive behind privatizing prisons, provides a rather counterintuitive approach to criminal justice. Instead of reducing the need for incarceration, for profit prison’s incentivizes the demand for it. Doing so undermines several facets of a viable prison system seeking to reintegrate inmates as productive citizens. According to a Justice Policy Institute report, direct campaign contributions, networking, and lobbying account for the private prison industry’s strategy towards legislative influence. Despite CCA’s financial annual report to the U.S. Securities and Exchange commission in 2012 claiming disengagement with lobbying for criminal legislation, Carl Takei ,a staff attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union National Prison Project wrote in 2011 that CCA allocated $710,300 for political contributions to federal and state office candidates, political action campaigns, and political parties.Through discreet funding, corporations like CCA and the GEO Group gain access to local, state, and federal policymakers as they help elect favorable officials.This is evident with increased contributions to state politicians , where 2010 in relation to previous election cycles since 2000, as reported by the 2011 Justice Policy Institute report, marked the largest contribution to state politicians. Consequently , according