I chose to write this paper. I could have made the decision to do otherwise. Seemingly, multiple different courses of action were at my disposal upon beginning this endeavor; as there are now, and will be later. Intuitively, this how we see free-will—as a path leading towards an array of alternative possibilities. It seems evident that that we possess the freedom to direct our course of actions in anyway we desire. But what if this was an illusion?
Such a claim is not as outlandish as it sounds. Analysis of the laws of nature and causal relationships support this assertion. Our brain, in particular our neural mechanisms, which we associate with decision making, seems to be governed by physical laws in a way that makes it predictable, and out …show more content…
Harry Frankfurt challenges the nation that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise. In his paper on the subject of free-will, Frankfurt presents an example intended to disrupt our notion of free-will and responsibility. Roughly, he presents a man—Jones—who, of his own will, desires to kill another man, Bill. A third man, Jack, having learned of Jones’ intentions and also desiring the death of Bill, decides to arrange things (we assume he has the power to do so) so that, if Jones were to change his mind, he could control him in a way that would force him to carry out the deed anyway. In the end, Jones proceeds with his initial desire to murder Bill without Jack’s intervention. Frankfurt’s point was to demonstrate that the ability to choose from alternative paths is not required for freedom, nor, consequently, moral responsibility. In other words, he 's using this case to reject the forking paths model, and advocate for a model of control that stems from the source of one’s …show more content…
Yet, determinism disturbs this notion, as well. As we stipulated earlier, if the facts of the past and the laws of nature determine the present, it seems that the source of our actions originate from before our time and thus exert power beyond our own agency. Frankfurt argues against this. Instead of seeing our actions as causally determined by facts of the past and laws of nature, Frankfurt explains that freely willed actions are the result of desires that mesh with hierarchically ordered elements of one’s psychology. Essentially, he is arguing that a person acts out from-will thanks to higher order desires that are encompassed deeper in their personality. In his paper, he distinguishes between first and second-order desires. The former relate to direct actions, such as eating or drinking; while second-order desires account for the desire of first-order desires. This source model states that a person’s actions stem from their intrinsic self, rather than something foreign, as determinism suggests.
This analysis of desires aims to establish not what a person can do in a given situation, but what they actually desire to do. Frankfurt hoped that, by recognizing the ultimate desire that influenced our sub-desires and guided our ultimate action, he would be able to establish personal agency and responsibility. Unfortunately, his theory is
Such a claim is not as outlandish as it sounds. Analysis of the laws of nature and causal relationships support this assertion. Our brain, in particular our neural mechanisms, which we associate with decision making, seems to be governed by physical laws in a way that makes it predictable, and out …show more content…
Harry Frankfurt challenges the nation that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise. In his paper on the subject of free-will, Frankfurt presents an example intended to disrupt our notion of free-will and responsibility. Roughly, he presents a man—Jones—who, of his own will, desires to kill another man, Bill. A third man, Jack, having learned of Jones’ intentions and also desiring the death of Bill, decides to arrange things (we assume he has the power to do so) so that, if Jones were to change his mind, he could control him in a way that would force him to carry out the deed anyway. In the end, Jones proceeds with his initial desire to murder Bill without Jack’s intervention. Frankfurt’s point was to demonstrate that the ability to choose from alternative paths is not required for freedom, nor, consequently, moral responsibility. In other words, he 's using this case to reject the forking paths model, and advocate for a model of control that stems from the source of one’s …show more content…
Yet, determinism disturbs this notion, as well. As we stipulated earlier, if the facts of the past and the laws of nature determine the present, it seems that the source of our actions originate from before our time and thus exert power beyond our own agency. Frankfurt argues against this. Instead of seeing our actions as causally determined by facts of the past and laws of nature, Frankfurt explains that freely willed actions are the result of desires that mesh with hierarchically ordered elements of one’s psychology. Essentially, he is arguing that a person acts out from-will thanks to higher order desires that are encompassed deeper in their personality. In his paper, he distinguishes between first and second-order desires. The former relate to direct actions, such as eating or drinking; while second-order desires account for the desire of first-order desires. This source model states that a person’s actions stem from their intrinsic self, rather than something foreign, as determinism suggests.
This analysis of desires aims to establish not what a person can do in a given situation, but what they actually desire to do. Frankfurt hoped that, by recognizing the ultimate desire that influenced our sub-desires and guided our ultimate action, he would be able to establish personal agency and responsibility. Unfortunately, his theory is