The relative strengths of the opposing Cold War belligerents were a direct result of their successive strategic actions intended to further their policy aims. American policy makers, under the umbrella of a grand strategy of containment, expanded upon Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy that promised “massive retaliation” in response to threats to American Security (Judge & Langdon, 101-102). To that end, the “New Look” reduced the size and budget for conventional military forces while it simultaneously increased spending for Strategic Air Command, and expanded procurement for atomic delivery systems (100-101). Furthermore, the Eisenhower administration identified three complementary efforts to stymie Communist advances: CIA covert operations, aiding
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Ultimately, Americans remained true to their grand strategy, and Eisenhower made good on his campaign promises of both “meeting the Soviet threat” while also “balancing the federal budget” (100).
America largely grasped its own strength and weaknesses correctly. It also, because of U-2 reconnaissance flights, possessed an accurate picture of Soviet defense capabilities and limitations. Specifically, Eisenhower comprehended the lack of the arms race, the much touted “bomber gap”, and Kennedy’s “missile gap” (CNN “Sputnik”, Judge & Langdon 114). This understanding enabled Eisenhower to assume small amounts of risk with conventional forces without fear of Soviet retaliation, including intervention into Lebanon in 1958 and concurrence with British intervention into Jordan in the same year (Class lecture, slide 21). Furthermore, since America classified its U-2 reconnaissance photographs as secret, Eisenhower was unable to …show more content…
In addition to the Soviets’ war of hearts and minds, Khrushchev furthered the global perception of Soviet industrial and technological superiority through very public tests of hydrogen weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and the launch of Sputnik (CNN “After Stalin”, “Sputnik”, Judge & Langdon, 107, 114-115). These technological advances, coupled with Khrushchev’s bomber and missile ruses, placed Eisenhower in a position of disadvantage (114). Khrushchev, aware of American reconnaissance flights, was also cognizant of the fact those flights were likely highly classified, and Eisenhower would be unable to disclose any information countering the perception of a missile and bomber gap
Ultimately, Americans remained true to their grand strategy, and Eisenhower made good on his campaign promises of both “meeting the Soviet threat” while also “balancing the federal budget” (100).
America largely grasped its own strength and weaknesses correctly. It also, because of U-2 reconnaissance flights, possessed an accurate picture of Soviet defense capabilities and limitations. Specifically, Eisenhower comprehended the lack of the arms race, the much touted “bomber gap”, and Kennedy’s “missile gap” (CNN “Sputnik”, Judge & Langdon 114). This understanding enabled Eisenhower to assume small amounts of risk with conventional forces without fear of Soviet retaliation, including intervention into Lebanon in 1958 and concurrence with British intervention into Jordan in the same year (Class lecture, slide 21). Furthermore, since America classified its U-2 reconnaissance photographs as secret, Eisenhower was unable to …show more content…
In addition to the Soviets’ war of hearts and minds, Khrushchev furthered the global perception of Soviet industrial and technological superiority through very public tests of hydrogen weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and the launch of Sputnik (CNN “After Stalin”, “Sputnik”, Judge & Langdon, 107, 114-115). These technological advances, coupled with Khrushchev’s bomber and missile ruses, placed Eisenhower in a position of disadvantage (114). Khrushchev, aware of American reconnaissance flights, was also cognizant of the fact those flights were likely highly classified, and Eisenhower would be unable to disclose any information countering the perception of a missile and bomber gap