Mind Body Identity
The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are indistinguishable to states and processes of the brain. it need not hold that the mind is identical to the brain. Idiomatically on a general basis we often say ‘She has a good mind’ and ‘She has a good brain’ interchangeably but we barely say ‘Her mind weighs fifty ounces’. Thus it is about identifying mind and brain as being a matter of identifying processes and maybe states of the mind and brain. Like for instance lets think about an experience of pain, or of seeing something, or of having a mental image. The identity theory of mind is to the achieve that these experiences just are brain processes, not simply correlated with brain processes. …show more content…
Some identity theorists give a behaviouristic analysis of mental states, such as beliefs and desires, but others, sometimes called ‘central state materialists’, say that mental states are actual brain states. Identity theorists often describe themselves as ‘materialists’ but ‘physicalists’ possibly will be a better word. That is, one might be a materialist about mind but nevertheless hold that there are entities referred to in physics that are not happily described as ‘material’.
In taking the identity theory (in its various forms) as a group of physicalism, this is an ontological, not a translational physicalism. It would be illogical to try to translate sentences containing the word ‘brain’ or the word ‘sensation’ into sentences about electrons, protons and so on. Nor can we so translate sentences containing the word ‘tree’. After all ‘tree’ is largely learned ostensively, and is not even part of botanical …show more content…
Place was using the word ‘logical’ in the way that it was used at Oxford at the time, not in the way that it is normally used now. One objection was that ‘sensation’ does not mean the same as ‘brain process’. Place's reply was to point out that ‘this table’ does not mean the same as ‘this old packing case’ and ‘lightning’ does not mean the same as ‘motion of electric charges’. It is to find out whether this is a table in a different way from the way in which we find out that it is an old packing case or whether a thing is lightning by looking and that it is a motion of electric charges by theory and experiment. This does not prevent the table being identical to the old packing case and the perceived lightning being nothing other than an electric discharge. Feigl and Smart put the matter more in terms of the distinction between meaning and reference. ‘Sensation’ and ‘brain process’ may differ in meaning and yet have the same reference. ‘Very bright planet seen in the morning’ and ‘very bright planet seen in the evening’ both refer to the same entity Venus. (Of course these expressions could be construed as referring to different things, different sequences of temporal stages of Venus, but not necessarily or most naturally
The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are indistinguishable to states and processes of the brain. it need not hold that the mind is identical to the brain. Idiomatically on a general basis we often say ‘She has a good mind’ and ‘She has a good brain’ interchangeably but we barely say ‘Her mind weighs fifty ounces’. Thus it is about identifying mind and brain as being a matter of identifying processes and maybe states of the mind and brain. Like for instance lets think about an experience of pain, or of seeing something, or of having a mental image. The identity theory of mind is to the achieve that these experiences just are brain processes, not simply correlated with brain processes. …show more content…
Some identity theorists give a behaviouristic analysis of mental states, such as beliefs and desires, but others, sometimes called ‘central state materialists’, say that mental states are actual brain states. Identity theorists often describe themselves as ‘materialists’ but ‘physicalists’ possibly will be a better word. That is, one might be a materialist about mind but nevertheless hold that there are entities referred to in physics that are not happily described as ‘material’.
In taking the identity theory (in its various forms) as a group of physicalism, this is an ontological, not a translational physicalism. It would be illogical to try to translate sentences containing the word ‘brain’ or the word ‘sensation’ into sentences about electrons, protons and so on. Nor can we so translate sentences containing the word ‘tree’. After all ‘tree’ is largely learned ostensively, and is not even part of botanical …show more content…
Place was using the word ‘logical’ in the way that it was used at Oxford at the time, not in the way that it is normally used now. One objection was that ‘sensation’ does not mean the same as ‘brain process’. Place's reply was to point out that ‘this table’ does not mean the same as ‘this old packing case’ and ‘lightning’ does not mean the same as ‘motion of electric charges’. It is to find out whether this is a table in a different way from the way in which we find out that it is an old packing case or whether a thing is lightning by looking and that it is a motion of electric charges by theory and experiment. This does not prevent the table being identical to the old packing case and the perceived lightning being nothing other than an electric discharge. Feigl and Smart put the matter more in terms of the distinction between meaning and reference. ‘Sensation’ and ‘brain process’ may differ in meaning and yet have the same reference. ‘Very bright planet seen in the morning’ and ‘very bright planet seen in the evening’ both refer to the same entity Venus. (Of course these expressions could be construed as referring to different things, different sequences of temporal stages of Venus, but not necessarily or most naturally