Two billion dollars, two days and hundreds of thousands of casualties. The American decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was and remains one of the most complex and challenging ethical and moral dilemmas. May 8th, 1945 marked German surrender and Victory in Europe day and in the Summer of 1945 Japan was clearly doomed for defeat. Despite this, the battle with Japan showed no clear exit. In an attempt to beat Germany, the United States conducted the Manhattan Project, an attempt to build an atomic bomb before the Germans. The project was completed in the summer of 1945 at the price of over two billion dollars, yet Germany was already defeated. Japan however, was not. On August 6th, 1945, the United States dropped the atomic
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Indeed, the Soviet Union was a threat, but the United States decision to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima was a military measure that came with the diplomatic benefit of intimidating the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was “poised to enter the war in the Pacific” (Brinkley 762) and according to a theory by historian Gar Alperovitz, the Americans believed that dropping the bomb would likely put the communist Soviet Union back in place both on the European and international stage. Several documents provide evidence to this train of thought. In Document F, future Secretary of State James Byrne is said to have focused on the usage of the atomic bomb as a way to control the Soviets in Europe and in Document E Prime Minister Winston Churchill remarks that “we should not need the Russians”. Similarly, in Document C, Dwight Eisenhower suggests to President Truman that it would be ideal for the United States if the Soviet Union stayed out of Japan. It was the point of view of each author that the Soviet Union was bad for America, and this makes historical sense, as the Americans and British were skeptical of the Soviets and vice versa. Bryne and Churchill are correct that the bomb would intimidate the Soviets, as Stalin was reportedly intimidated by the bomb (Gaddis), and Eisenhower’s opinion on the Soviet Union agreed with many senior US officials at the …show more content…
Similarly, according to Soviet Major General Valentin Larionov, at the end of World War II, between the American and Soviet soldiers “no one thought then about any aggravations of the situation; everyone thought that the peace had come” there were only “embraces without any ulterior motives, truly friendly embraces” (Larionov). Both countries could have shaken hands and packed up, but rather they showed warmth and hospitality between the nations. Significantly, this interaction was between the nations’ militaries, who typically would be more sensitive to potential enemies. The general sense was that peace, not hostility was in the future, suggesting that while the United States wanted to knock the Soviets down on the global level, the US did not see the Soviets as enough of a threat to drop the atomic bomb purely to intimidate
Indeed, the Soviet Union was a threat, but the United States decision to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima was a military measure that came with the diplomatic benefit of intimidating the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was “poised to enter the war in the Pacific” (Brinkley 762) and according to a theory by historian Gar Alperovitz, the Americans believed that dropping the bomb would likely put the communist Soviet Union back in place both on the European and international stage. Several documents provide evidence to this train of thought. In Document F, future Secretary of State James Byrne is said to have focused on the usage of the atomic bomb as a way to control the Soviets in Europe and in Document E Prime Minister Winston Churchill remarks that “we should not need the Russians”. Similarly, in Document C, Dwight Eisenhower suggests to President Truman that it would be ideal for the United States if the Soviet Union stayed out of Japan. It was the point of view of each author that the Soviet Union was bad for America, and this makes historical sense, as the Americans and British were skeptical of the Soviets and vice versa. Bryne and Churchill are correct that the bomb would intimidate the Soviets, as Stalin was reportedly intimidated by the bomb (Gaddis), and Eisenhower’s opinion on the Soviet Union agreed with many senior US officials at the …show more content…
Similarly, according to Soviet Major General Valentin Larionov, at the end of World War II, between the American and Soviet soldiers “no one thought then about any aggravations of the situation; everyone thought that the peace had come” there were only “embraces without any ulterior motives, truly friendly embraces” (Larionov). Both countries could have shaken hands and packed up, but rather they showed warmth and hospitality between the nations. Significantly, this interaction was between the nations’ militaries, who typically would be more sensitive to potential enemies. The general sense was that peace, not hostility was in the future, suggesting that while the United States wanted to knock the Soviets down on the global level, the US did not see the Soviets as enough of a threat to drop the atomic bomb purely to intimidate