Involvement In Afghanistan

Military involvement in Afghanistan has been historically ineffective, and characterized by bad strategy. In order to run a successful campaign in this area, a military must develop an effort which incorporates tactics known as COIN operations to minimize the “Accidental-Guerilla” syndrome. Specifically speaking, three major pieces of COIN ideology are relevant in regard to the Afghan conflict. This particular campaign must seek to legitimize the Afghan government by creating local change based upon a region-wide approach. However, the practices lauded by COIN proponents such as Kilcullen should not be adopted religiously. Colonel Gentile’s field experience has shown that traditional COIN tactics alone will be insufficient as stratagem …show more content…
Strategists should focus on finding government figureheads who are incorruptible and truly desire to see their country progress. Corrupt government has been a long-standing issue in this part of the world, and this tendency is one of the major causes of public distrust. It is also important for international relations purposes that the Coalition forces replace chaos with order. A new government which is just as corrupt as its predecessor will only cause more issues. Continuity is also important as an aspect of Coalition personnel policy. If Colonel Gentile’s experience has provided strategists with anything, it is the understanding that the “savior-general” narrative is largely false and counterproductive to war efforts. Continuity is a key aspect of COIN tactics because it allows Coalition forces to develop a deeper understanding of the theatres in which they are …show more content…
What this ideology entails is the protection of communities and individuals where they reside, rather than through forced garrison. This security is a service which can be begun by Coalition forces and transitioned into local hands. This effort must begin with the extermination of hardline extremists. Once these extremists have been removed from the population by Coalition firepower, the creation of local security forces unified under the national police system will provide communities with ties to their country and a purpose in opposing infiltration from extremist groups. These security forces should be tasked with protecting new roads and infrastructure provided by their government. The creation of these groups will lessen the required number of Coalition troops necessary for security, which addresses Colonel Gentile’s concern regarding the amount of resources required by COIN tactics. It will also limit the number of accidental guerillas available to the extremists, and alleviate local concerns of governmental control. Essentially, once small population centers understand that working against the Taliban and AQI is beneficial to their existence, the effort to eradicate these groups will become much simpler. Tasking the individual communities with protecting their resources is a strategy which can be employed through various tactical methods and one which will