The documents in the “Against Withdrawal” dossier provide a comprehensive and roughly chronological overview of the various arguments in favor of a sustained American military presence in Iraq. Tracking the evolution of the anti-withdrawal stance from 2006 through 2011, the articles present a united assessment of the situation on the ground that remains remarkably consistent over time. All of these authors contend, to some degree, that any apparent progress toward a secure Iraqi state and stable political environment is probably illusory and likely fragile if it indeed exists, and that the premature departure of a stabilizing external force could result in the worst possible outcome for both Iraqi and American national interests – a regression
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Again marking the potential acceleration of sectarian violence “to genocidal dimensions” as a primary threat, Kissinger also takes pains to reframe the continuing American military commitment as “a new grand strategy relating power to diplomacy for the entire region,” demonstrating a precise awareness of Rose’s directive to view armed intervention as a means to achieving an ultimate political end. Crucially, he directly addresses critics who tout pure diplomacy as a feasible alternative, suggesting that “it is not possible to jettison the military instrument” because “the attempt to separate diplomacy and power results in power lacking direction and diplomacy lacking incentives.” While one could quibble with this maxim as a general rule, Kissinger’s analysis seems to hold true in this particular circumstance. Pre-surge and pre-Sunni Awakening, the existential threat that the militias presented to Maliki’s government implies that American military assistance afforded us enormous leverage over governing authorities – a position that would surely be usurped by Iran if our forces withdrew at that moment. Straddling the pre-and-post-surge era, Kissinger’s article successfully presents both security and politics as powerful motives for ongoing military intervention. At this phase, the two objectives were more intimately intertwined than ever before, and the role of military might in addressing the former created an incentive structure that may have allowed us, had we taken full advantage of it, to influence the latter – bringing Iraq that much closer to becoming a “competent political
Again marking the potential acceleration of sectarian violence “to genocidal dimensions” as a primary threat, Kissinger also takes pains to reframe the continuing American military commitment as “a new grand strategy relating power to diplomacy for the entire region,” demonstrating a precise awareness of Rose’s directive to view armed intervention as a means to achieving an ultimate political end. Crucially, he directly addresses critics who tout pure diplomacy as a feasible alternative, suggesting that “it is not possible to jettison the military instrument” because “the attempt to separate diplomacy and power results in power lacking direction and diplomacy lacking incentives.” While one could quibble with this maxim as a general rule, Kissinger’s analysis seems to hold true in this particular circumstance. Pre-surge and pre-Sunni Awakening, the existential threat that the militias presented to Maliki’s government implies that American military assistance afforded us enormous leverage over governing authorities – a position that would surely be usurped by Iran if our forces withdrew at that moment. Straddling the pre-and-post-surge era, Kissinger’s article successfully presents both security and politics as powerful motives for ongoing military intervention. At this phase, the two objectives were more intimately intertwined than ever before, and the role of military might in addressing the former created an incentive structure that may have allowed us, had we taken full advantage of it, to influence the latter – bringing Iraq that much closer to becoming a “competent political