The main reason this was significant is because it included the pregnant woman's physical and mental wellbeing and did not just apply to saving the woman from death. In Bourne the continuance of the young girl’s pregnancy would have caused her to become a ‘mental wreck’. Bourne operated the abortion ‘in good faith’ and his purpose was to ‘preserve the life of the mother’. Bourne was acquitted on these grounds and the case was decided in his favour.
The defence created by common law in Bourne is now integrated within the Abortion Act 1967. The Act provided a defence to the OAPA 1861 . As long as two opinions of medical practioners were formed in good faith, the Act would permit abortion if:
(a) the continuance of the pregnancy would involve …show more content…
The ILPA 1929 creates an offence of child destruction, which will be committed when a foetus that is over the age of 28 weeks is destroyed. At the time, it was thought when these two Acts were read together that the time limit imposed on abortions for a ‘child capable of being born alive’ was understood to be 28 weeks by virtue of the ILPA 1929.
Even if one of the grounds were present to allow an abortion, if this was carried out post 28 weeks then one may still be found guilty of child destruction under s1 (1) of ILPA 1929 . If the reason is to preserve the life of the mother then why should twenty-eight weeks still be applicable? With the law at this time, if the doctor had carried out an abortion after this time, then they may fall under the scope of this Act and commit an offence of child destruction.
In 1990, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA) amended the Abortion Act 1967. S37 of the HFEA had replaced S1 (1) of the Abortion Act 1967. Now, S1 (1)(a) of the Abortion Act 1967 states that there will be no offence of abortion if two doctors, in good faith form an opinion that:
(a) That the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her
The defence created by common law in Bourne is now integrated within the Abortion Act 1967. The Act provided a defence to the OAPA 1861 . As long as two opinions of medical practioners were formed in good faith, the Act would permit abortion if:
(a) the continuance of the pregnancy would involve …show more content…
The ILPA 1929 creates an offence of child destruction, which will be committed when a foetus that is over the age of 28 weeks is destroyed. At the time, it was thought when these two Acts were read together that the time limit imposed on abortions for a ‘child capable of being born alive’ was understood to be 28 weeks by virtue of the ILPA 1929.
Even if one of the grounds were present to allow an abortion, if this was carried out post 28 weeks then one may still be found guilty of child destruction under s1 (1) of ILPA 1929 . If the reason is to preserve the life of the mother then why should twenty-eight weeks still be applicable? With the law at this time, if the doctor had carried out an abortion after this time, then they may fall under the scope of this Act and commit an offence of child destruction.
In 1990, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA) amended the Abortion Act 1967. S37 of the HFEA had replaced S1 (1) of the Abortion Act 1967. Now, S1 (1)(a) of the Abortion Act 1967 states that there will be no offence of abortion if two doctors, in good faith form an opinion that:
(a) That the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her