Southwest and Delta are shown in the defensive category. Ries and Trout give three principles to effective defensive warfare. The first principle is for only leaders should play defensively. This is especially important when two leaders are identical in market share. An attack from an opposing airline would quickly send one opponent into offense. After all, each competitor’s market share is shifting and today’s leader may not be the leader next year when companies like Southwest and Delta remain in close quarters. Once a leader has been identified between the two leading airlines, the straggler must retreat to the offensive position. If Delta was sliding out of the leadership position, it will not save them to continue playing defense. Just
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Additionally, as offensive players, United and American Airlines should not target each other, but only aim at the leader. Ries and Trout offer three principles for offensive players as well. The first principle advises offenders to focus less on themselves and increasingly more on the leaders. The concept ties closely with the author’s book The 22 Immutable Laws of Marketing, and the idea which states having the better product does not win. Notably, focusing on having the best product only reinforces our lack of attention to the front-runners. Therefore, United and American airlines must formulate strategies around transforming Delta and Southwest customers to their own. We learned in Cialdini’s book Influence that is nearly impossible for companies to convert opposing customers who are loyal to a particular brand to our own. Thus, their best chance of converting customers is to target those who are not particularly loyal or who may be on the fence with Delta or Southwest. Offering a special promotion to undecided flyers of the leading airline may convince the prospect that you value their business. Whereas, Southwest and Delta may be too focused on their loyal customers to be concerned about fleeing one time …show more content…
Raising funds will be problematic since their surprise attack will require BGA to reduce their overall publicity until the day the carrier will begin scheduling passengers. To lessen initial startup costs for BGA, the number of planes they introduce could be small at first. It would be important to allocate the small number of planes in high traffic airports such as DFW International to gain widespread acknowledgement by prospects. Lessening the amount of planes will also reduce the amount of staff required, which also promotes less talk about a potentially new airline. BGA could safely fly under the radar of other airline giants by starting with fifty aircrafts and less than twenty-five hundred staff
Additionally, as offensive players, United and American Airlines should not target each other, but only aim at the leader. Ries and Trout offer three principles for offensive players as well. The first principle advises offenders to focus less on themselves and increasingly more on the leaders. The concept ties closely with the author’s book The 22 Immutable Laws of Marketing, and the idea which states having the better product does not win. Notably, focusing on having the best product only reinforces our lack of attention to the front-runners. Therefore, United and American airlines must formulate strategies around transforming Delta and Southwest customers to their own. We learned in Cialdini’s book Influence that is nearly impossible for companies to convert opposing customers who are loyal to a particular brand to our own. Thus, their best chance of converting customers is to target those who are not particularly loyal or who may be on the fence with Delta or Southwest. Offering a special promotion to undecided flyers of the leading airline may convince the prospect that you value their business. Whereas, Southwest and Delta may be too focused on their loyal customers to be concerned about fleeing one time …show more content…
Raising funds will be problematic since their surprise attack will require BGA to reduce their overall publicity until the day the carrier will begin scheduling passengers. To lessen initial startup costs for BGA, the number of planes they introduce could be small at first. It would be important to allocate the small number of planes in high traffic airports such as DFW International to gain widespread acknowledgement by prospects. Lessening the amount of planes will also reduce the amount of staff required, which also promotes less talk about a potentially new airline. BGA could safely fly under the radar of other airline giants by starting with fifty aircrafts and less than twenty-five hundred staff