In Plato’s, Five Dialogues, inklings of the Hobbesian notion of the social contract begin to assemble within the dialogue of Crito as the theory of tacit consent is explored. At the start of the dialogue, Crito proposes that Socrates should escape from Athenian prison with his assistance, however, Socrates is adamant against an attempted escape, arguing [from the polis’ perspective] that, “Whoever of you remains…has in fact come to an agreement with us [the polis] to obey our [the polis’] instructions’ (51e).” Two questions arise from Socrates’ argument: Does tacit consent exist? And if it does exist, does it foster obedience within a society? In response, this paper will argue that in respect to the Athenian polis, tacit consent exists in two forms: the first form being where the individual cannot consent to the societal agreement, and the second form being where the individual is old enough to understand the notion of their negative responsibility to the polis, and can therefore consent. This paper will examine both the legitimacy of each form, and whether or not it is just. For our definition of just, Socrates’ implicit definition that “one must never do wrong,” (49b) and “doing people harm is no different from wrongdoing.” (49c) will suffice.
