In Supreme Command, Eliot Cohen offers an answer to the civil-military challenge of the relationship between politicians and military leaders. Cohen suggests that the best war statesmen are active in military strategy and decision-making as well as questioning or prodding their generals. Unlike what he refers to as the “normal” theory of civil-military relationships espoused by Samuel Huntington, Cohen chooses a view more akin to Carl von Clausewitz that “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means” (p. 7-8). Cohen uses four wartime statesmen to provide support to this idea that the best answer to civil-military relationships is one of the civilian
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208) and cross-examined/questioned the military leaders’ decisions forcing debates on different views (p. 212). He also described how the statesmen he wrote about developed a strategy of their own to reach the political goals of the war. Cohen additionally uses the absence of these primary items (bilateral questioning and developing overarching strategy) in his chapter on “Leadership Without Genius” to illustrate less successful leadership. Each of the war statesmen Cohen wrote about exhibit these exemplary characteristics. How then to determine which case does the better job of supporting Cohen’s argument? Although Cohen himself states there is a “lack of an adequate standard for judging statesmanship, and war statesmanship above all” (p. 113), he also notes it is a statesman’s “ability to adapt, and not in the capacity for grand design, that a war statesman finds his largest test.” (p. 32) This “largest test” of adaptability tips the balance to the case of Lincoln as doing a better job of supporting Cohen’s premise of strong civil control of the military throughout …show more content…
Take for example, Churchill’s exchange with General Brooke regarding the VICTOR exercise. Churchill did not believe the underlying assumptions of the exercise regarding a German invasion on British soil but instead of an outright dictate to change, he engaged in a debate of ideas from late March until mid-May. Brooke continued to answer Churchill’s questions and to disagree with him; for this Brooke was promoted as Churchill appreciated the candor and questioning (p. 118-120). From these examples, Churchill does the better job of probing and questioning deeply in order to achieve results from his subordinates.
Both Lincoln and Churchill developed overarching strategies that were on target for what their war needed to achieve. Lincoln’s initial overarching strategy for winning the war is described by Cohen as fivefold:
1) Restoration of the Union, with slavery not expanded beyond where it existed in 1860.
2) The war had to begin with Southern aggression in order to maintain the fragile Union coalition.
3) The Confederacy must be deprived of external
208) and cross-examined/questioned the military leaders’ decisions forcing debates on different views (p. 212). He also described how the statesmen he wrote about developed a strategy of their own to reach the political goals of the war. Cohen additionally uses the absence of these primary items (bilateral questioning and developing overarching strategy) in his chapter on “Leadership Without Genius” to illustrate less successful leadership. Each of the war statesmen Cohen wrote about exhibit these exemplary characteristics. How then to determine which case does the better job of supporting Cohen’s argument? Although Cohen himself states there is a “lack of an adequate standard for judging statesmanship, and war statesmanship above all” (p. 113), he also notes it is a statesman’s “ability to adapt, and not in the capacity for grand design, that a war statesman finds his largest test.” (p. 32) This “largest test” of adaptability tips the balance to the case of Lincoln as doing a better job of supporting Cohen’s premise of strong civil control of the military throughout …show more content…
Take for example, Churchill’s exchange with General Brooke regarding the VICTOR exercise. Churchill did not believe the underlying assumptions of the exercise regarding a German invasion on British soil but instead of an outright dictate to change, he engaged in a debate of ideas from late March until mid-May. Brooke continued to answer Churchill’s questions and to disagree with him; for this Brooke was promoted as Churchill appreciated the candor and questioning (p. 118-120). From these examples, Churchill does the better job of probing and questioning deeply in order to achieve results from his subordinates.
Both Lincoln and Churchill developed overarching strategies that were on target for what their war needed to achieve. Lincoln’s initial overarching strategy for winning the war is described by Cohen as fivefold:
1) Restoration of the Union, with slavery not expanded beyond where it existed in 1860.
2) The war had to begin with Southern aggression in order to maintain the fragile Union coalition.
3) The Confederacy must be deprived of external