Generalizations derived from traditional international politics do not apply today in the following ways: war between great powers is unthinkable, so new world orders will emerge; because of the high interdependence of states, Gross Domestic Product is no longer a valid measurement of power; and the presence of data and cyber-security issues causes problems regarding globalization and who controls cyberspace, which can decrease American hegemony. According to Robert Jervis in his essay, “The Era of Leading Power and Peace,” “Threatening war, preparing for it, and trying to avoid it have permeated all aspects of politics, and so a world in which war among the most developed states is unthinkable will be very different from the history with
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Jervis argues that four possible world orders may arise out of this unique scenario: a world in which national autonomy is diminished and barriers between states disintegrate, a world in which there is more cooperation between states, yet states retain national autonomy, a world in which the United States dominates and acts freely, and a world in which a “counter-balancing coalition” is created to offset the U.S.’s power (Jervis). These four orders represent a significant departure from “traditional” international politics in that the theory that “leading powers always struggle for dominance for gain, status, or security, and are willing to use force to this end” no longer applies (Jervis). To summarize, states no longer have to worry about a fully anarchic world where they must rely on self-help, as Realists would argue. …show more content…
In 2015, the European Court of Justice invalidated the Safe Harbor Agreement, which allowed U.S. companies to transfer data outside of the European Union. This decision was made to give Europeans privacy over their data, since the U.S. would no longer be able to store it abroad. This decision alarmed the U.S., since it was used to making the rules. This decision represents a change in international politics. No longer can the U.S. be the global data hegemon, rather, other countries are beginning to take power for themselves. According to Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman in their essay, “The Transatlantic Data War,” the U.S. can either “continue to work in a world of blurred lines and unilateral demands” or “recognize that globalization comes in different flavors and that Europeans have real and legitimate problems with ubiquitous U.S. surveillance and unilateralism” (Farrell & Newman). This ruling is similar to the fourth world order that Jervis describes, a world where “counter-balancing” is created to offset U.S. power. This shows that previous international politics assumptions regarding the unchallenged hegemony of the U.S. are not true—Europe is willing to assert their dominance as well. This ruling also illuminates another problem that current scholars will have to take into account—data
Jervis argues that four possible world orders may arise out of this unique scenario: a world in which national autonomy is diminished and barriers between states disintegrate, a world in which there is more cooperation between states, yet states retain national autonomy, a world in which the United States dominates and acts freely, and a world in which a “counter-balancing coalition” is created to offset the U.S.’s power (Jervis). These four orders represent a significant departure from “traditional” international politics in that the theory that “leading powers always struggle for dominance for gain, status, or security, and are willing to use force to this end” no longer applies (Jervis). To summarize, states no longer have to worry about a fully anarchic world where they must rely on self-help, as Realists would argue. …show more content…
In 2015, the European Court of Justice invalidated the Safe Harbor Agreement, which allowed U.S. companies to transfer data outside of the European Union. This decision was made to give Europeans privacy over their data, since the U.S. would no longer be able to store it abroad. This decision alarmed the U.S., since it was used to making the rules. This decision represents a change in international politics. No longer can the U.S. be the global data hegemon, rather, other countries are beginning to take power for themselves. According to Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman in their essay, “The Transatlantic Data War,” the U.S. can either “continue to work in a world of blurred lines and unilateral demands” or “recognize that globalization comes in different flavors and that Europeans have real and legitimate problems with ubiquitous U.S. surveillance and unilateralism” (Farrell & Newman). This ruling is similar to the fourth world order that Jervis describes, a world where “counter-balancing” is created to offset U.S. power. This shows that previous international politics assumptions regarding the unchallenged hegemony of the U.S. are not true—Europe is willing to assert their dominance as well. This ruling also illuminates another problem that current scholars will have to take into account—data