5. Economic Stability as the Legitimacy of Suharto’s Regime
After the coup attempt of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) on 30 September 1965, also known as G30S/PKI, during which six of the most important generals of the National Army, the anti-communist group in the government, were kidnapped and brutally killed, the army gained the justification to condemn the action of the PKI. Sukarno and his men, who were supported by PKI and also defended the communists’ position in the Parliament, were stripped of their political position and their involvement in the killing of the six generals was question in the course of a trial. Many of them were sentenced to death. The communist party leaders and an estimated 150,000–200,000 persons associated …show more content…
9. In Decree No. 18, the MPRS cancelled the MPRS Decree of 1963, which had appointed Sukarno as President-for-Life, and in Decree No. 11, it called for a general election in July 1968 (Pauker 1967a: 147-148). Until then, Suharto had the authority to act as the de facto leader of the republic, and was instructed by the MPRS to immediately reshuffle Sukarno’s cabinet with economic and political stability as the main purpose. This cabinet was supervised by a presidium of five chief ministers led by Suharto as Chairman of the Presidium and Chief Minister of Defense and …show more content…
Therefore, to deductively analyze Suharto’s choice, which led to the economic liberalization, the constraints in this situation may point out the determining drivers, particularly the internal ones. The catastrophic economic situation, Suharto’s weak legitimacy, and fewer supporters were clearly constraining his actions at the time. In comparison to Suharto, it appeared that Sukarno was able to ignore or, at least, did not prioritize the solving of economic problems and acted autonomously because of his President-for-Life position. In contrast, Suharto needed to solve economic problems to boost people’s trust and his credibility as the successor of Sukarno’s strong “First President” figure. The questions of “How would Suharto solve this problem?” and “Why was economic liberalization initiated by Suharto at the time?” are strongly related to the third constraint—fewer supporters and their homogenous (anti-communist) characteristic.
At the time of the economic recession, several alternative perspectives and criticisms for Sukarno’s ‘guided economy’ began to emerge. A group of University of Indonesia (UI) economists—Widjojo Nitisastro, Emil Salim, Mohammad Sadli, Subroto, Ali Wardhana, and Prawiro—were at the frontline criticizing Sukarno’s economic policy
After the coup attempt of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) on 30 September 1965, also known as G30S/PKI, during which six of the most important generals of the National Army, the anti-communist group in the government, were kidnapped and brutally killed, the army gained the justification to condemn the action of the PKI. Sukarno and his men, who were supported by PKI and also defended the communists’ position in the Parliament, were stripped of their political position and their involvement in the killing of the six generals was question in the course of a trial. Many of them were sentenced to death. The communist party leaders and an estimated 150,000–200,000 persons associated …show more content…
9. In Decree No. 18, the MPRS cancelled the MPRS Decree of 1963, which had appointed Sukarno as President-for-Life, and in Decree No. 11, it called for a general election in July 1968 (Pauker 1967a: 147-148). Until then, Suharto had the authority to act as the de facto leader of the republic, and was instructed by the MPRS to immediately reshuffle Sukarno’s cabinet with economic and political stability as the main purpose. This cabinet was supervised by a presidium of five chief ministers led by Suharto as Chairman of the Presidium and Chief Minister of Defense and …show more content…
Therefore, to deductively analyze Suharto’s choice, which led to the economic liberalization, the constraints in this situation may point out the determining drivers, particularly the internal ones. The catastrophic economic situation, Suharto’s weak legitimacy, and fewer supporters were clearly constraining his actions at the time. In comparison to Suharto, it appeared that Sukarno was able to ignore or, at least, did not prioritize the solving of economic problems and acted autonomously because of his President-for-Life position. In contrast, Suharto needed to solve economic problems to boost people’s trust and his credibility as the successor of Sukarno’s strong “First President” figure. The questions of “How would Suharto solve this problem?” and “Why was economic liberalization initiated by Suharto at the time?” are strongly related to the third constraint—fewer supporters and their homogenous (anti-communist) characteristic.
At the time of the economic recession, several alternative perspectives and criticisms for Sukarno’s ‘guided economy’ began to emerge. A group of University of Indonesia (UI) economists—Widjojo Nitisastro, Emil Salim, Mohammad Sadli, Subroto, Ali Wardhana, and Prawiro—were at the frontline criticizing Sukarno’s economic policy