Similarly, the role of consent can ensure that state interests are served. As consent will likely not be given if states view the law as harmful to their interest, this will trigger further negotiations until an agreement is reached, therefore providing a system where states can ensure that their interests and welfare are protected. Critically, if a state is not a participating party in a lawmaking process, its state interests will be unprotected. This is seen in OPEC where as an overall major influence in global oil price, member states will want the price to be at a profiting level, which can negatively affect the rest of the world.
Whilst the role played by consent in international lawmaking may seem perfect, there are problems that originate from it which can undermine the effectiveness of the international lawmaking regime.
Although consent encourages the compliance of rules, in reality, it does not mean that states will respect the rules completely. This is demonstrated in the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement. A lot of developing countries, feeling that stronger IP protection would make IP harder to access, and therefore reducing their gains, only consented because it was a requirement for WTO membership.
Another weaknesses is the difficulty to reach an agreement. In international …show more content…
States are unlikely to consent if they stand to lose in an international law agreement, thus indicating that Pareto improvements, where ceteris paribus, a change will not make anyone worse off but make everyone better off, has to be present. As consent is required before a rule is adopted, in order for those, who stand to lose if the agreement remained unchanged, to gain something, states may have to compromise, which means reducing their potential
Whilst the role played by consent in international lawmaking may seem perfect, there are problems that originate from it which can undermine the effectiveness of the international lawmaking regime.
Although consent encourages the compliance of rules, in reality, it does not mean that states will respect the rules completely. This is demonstrated in the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement. A lot of developing countries, feeling that stronger IP protection would make IP harder to access, and therefore reducing their gains, only consented because it was a requirement for WTO membership.
Another weaknesses is the difficulty to reach an agreement. In international …show more content…
States are unlikely to consent if they stand to lose in an international law agreement, thus indicating that Pareto improvements, where ceteris paribus, a change will not make anyone worse off but make everyone better off, has to be present. As consent is required before a rule is adopted, in order for those, who stand to lose if the agreement remained unchanged, to gain something, states may have to compromise, which means reducing their potential