In Part One of The Ethics, Spinoza establishes his substance monism and proves that God, as an infinite being, is the sole substance in the universe. The task that follows in Part Two is to explicate the character of everything else which flows from the nature of God. In Proposition 7, he outlines what has since been termed the “parallelism” doctrine (Heide 02 Mar). He faces the challenge of explaining why why ideas and bodies appear to be so consistently coordinated, given that they are modes of the distinct attributes of thought and extension respectively. They have nothing in common and, therefore, have no causal interaction with one another (Pr.3,I). According to his parallelism, ideas and bodies are merely two different expressions of the same substance, God, each reflecting God 's nature through its proper attribute. The argument for this position relies on Spinoza 's conception of substance, on his account of attributes, on his theory of causation, and, finally, on how the term “infinite” ought to be interpreted in his metaphysics. Spinoza has previously asserted the axiom that to have knowledge of a particular effect, it is necessary to first have knowledge of its cause (Ax.4,I). From this, he claims, it is clear that the “power of thinking” and the “power of acting” of God correspond to one another so that everything possessing formal reality which follows from his essence perfectly agrees in “order and connection” with the ideas that God has of these things (Cor.Pr.7,II). Ideas owe their “formal being,” or reality, only to God as their “efficient cause” (Pr.5,II). It cannot be the case that the idea of a specific circle, to use Spinoza 's example, is caused by an actual circle existing as an extended object. Spinoza explains this with appeal to the idea of God, which contains both the idea of the infinite things following from his nature and the idea of his nature (Pr.3,II). God has this idea in virtue of the fact that he is thinking, and no reference to the object of the idea, in this case himself, is needed. The formal reality of an idea, then, is caused by God 's nature as expressed through thought, and thought alone, because no other attribute is required to conceive it (Pr.5,II). Every attribute of God is understood through itself, meaning that all modes of that attribute will similarly require no mention of another attribute. An idea, a mode of thought, is caused by God as a thinking being, and a body, a mode of extension, by God as an extended being (Pr.6,II). Just as God has ideas without reference to their objects, bodies flow from God not due to his ideas of them, but because of the expression of his essence through extension (Cor.Pr.6,II). There is only one substance, God, which has infinite attributes and from which infinite things follow. As a result, bodies and ideas cannot be distinct substances. What separates them is the manner in which they are understood, with comprehension of bodies requiring the attribute of extension and ideas the attribute of thought. For instance, if there is a circle which is an object in the world, there is a corresponding idea of that circle. Both exist as modes of God, or substance, but, the idea of the circle is metaphysically identical to the actual circle. The difference between the idea of the circle and its object, then, is solely a matter of which attribute, thought or extension, the circle is being considered
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Attributes have nothing in common with each other, a feature which also prevents them from causally impacting one another. Attributes are metaphysically secondary to substance, and are just different ways by which “the intellect perceives” the essence of substance (Def.4,I). There is one substance which is self-caused through its own essence, and that is God. Consequently, Spinoza must be committed to there being two separate causal explanations for the universe because, otherwise, it would be true that an idea could be understood through extension and by reference to bodies, which is incoherent. There is nothing in thought, or its manifestation as ideas, which contains any content that can also be found in extended bodies. Similarly, it makes no sense to speak of a body in terms of ideas and thought, which by definition must exclude
Attributes have nothing in common with each other, a feature which also prevents them from causally impacting one another. Attributes are metaphysically secondary to substance, and are just different ways by which “the intellect perceives” the essence of substance (Def.4,I). There is one substance which is self-caused through its own essence, and that is God. Consequently, Spinoza must be committed to there being two separate causal explanations for the universe because, otherwise, it would be true that an idea could be understood through extension and by reference to bodies, which is incoherent. There is nothing in thought, or its manifestation as ideas, which contains any content that can also be found in extended bodies. Similarly, it makes no sense to speak of a body in terms of ideas and thought, which by definition must exclude