The political, economic and social issues in the Weimar Republic up to 1929 were successfully managed to a poor extent by the German government 's, followed by a gradual improvement over the course of its existence. Since its foundations in 1918, the Republic found itself irreparably burdened by various social, economic and political factors that climaxed in 1923 with immense severity. A large number of issues arose both from internal and external factors alike, incapacitating the government from effectively managing Germany’s existing and historical issues. Politically, those of the left and the right had put the Democratic Republic, particularly the Ebert government, at fault for the harsh conditions of the Treaty of Versailles and aimed
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Consecutive governments significantly struggled to manage such mass disillusionment and grievance. Under the leadership of Friedrich Ebert of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), numerous attempts to stabilise the political unrest within Germany following the Versailles Treaty failed to address underlying sentiments that threatened to destroy the Republic from within. A view backed up by many historians, the Ebert government did not adhere to the expectations of the German people nor did it solve the political unrest within Germany. ‘It was a Republic of those who were willing to be reasonable,’ writes historian Paul Bookbinder, ‘however, not enough people supported this Republic - the first democratic state in German history’. (http://alphahistory.com/weimarrepublic/why-the-weimar-republic-failed) Bookbinder argues within his article ‘Why the Weimar Republic failed’ that the Ebert government’s success would have been due to a well-informed and open-minded population, although the proud and nationalistic mentality of the First Reich had still continued during the revolutionary years and far beyond. It is therefore evident that the Ebert government, not the population, was unsuccessful in …show more content…
The diplomatic actions of forming agreements and relationships with other European nations, such as the U.S., Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Italy, had resulted in political strength within the Weimar Republic. The Dawes Plan of 1924 had an impact on the reparations of the regime as it reduced the amount of money owed from 132 billion gold marks (US$33 billion) to 1000 million marks in 1925, followed by an increase of 2500 million marks over the next five years and an adjusted amount from then on, according to Germany’s capacity to pay. Similarly as effective, the 1925 Locarno Pact marked a new beginning in European relations, as it guaranteed peace between France, Germany and Belgium. This also guaranteed French withdrawal from the Ruhr, which allowed the German people to once again work in one of Germany’s most industrialised areas. The joining of the League of Nations in 1926 allowed Germany an added voice in world affairs and a source of assistance of which Germany could seek to settle other German grievances. Continuing the work of the Dawes Plan, Stresemann’s final successful foreign policy, the Young Plan of 1929, also had a large impact on Weimar Germany as it reduced the final reparation figure from the previous 132,000 million marks to 37,000 million marks, with the extension of
Consecutive governments significantly struggled to manage such mass disillusionment and grievance. Under the leadership of Friedrich Ebert of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), numerous attempts to stabilise the political unrest within Germany following the Versailles Treaty failed to address underlying sentiments that threatened to destroy the Republic from within. A view backed up by many historians, the Ebert government did not adhere to the expectations of the German people nor did it solve the political unrest within Germany. ‘It was a Republic of those who were willing to be reasonable,’ writes historian Paul Bookbinder, ‘however, not enough people supported this Republic - the first democratic state in German history’. (http://alphahistory.com/weimarrepublic/why-the-weimar-republic-failed) Bookbinder argues within his article ‘Why the Weimar Republic failed’ that the Ebert government’s success would have been due to a well-informed and open-minded population, although the proud and nationalistic mentality of the First Reich had still continued during the revolutionary years and far beyond. It is therefore evident that the Ebert government, not the population, was unsuccessful in …show more content…
The diplomatic actions of forming agreements and relationships with other European nations, such as the U.S., Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Italy, had resulted in political strength within the Weimar Republic. The Dawes Plan of 1924 had an impact on the reparations of the regime as it reduced the amount of money owed from 132 billion gold marks (US$33 billion) to 1000 million marks in 1925, followed by an increase of 2500 million marks over the next five years and an adjusted amount from then on, according to Germany’s capacity to pay. Similarly as effective, the 1925 Locarno Pact marked a new beginning in European relations, as it guaranteed peace between France, Germany and Belgium. This also guaranteed French withdrawal from the Ruhr, which allowed the German people to once again work in one of Germany’s most industrialised areas. The joining of the League of Nations in 1926 allowed Germany an added voice in world affairs and a source of assistance of which Germany could seek to settle other German grievances. Continuing the work of the Dawes Plan, Stresemann’s final successful foreign policy, the Young Plan of 1929, also had a large impact on Weimar Germany as it reduced the final reparation figure from the previous 132,000 million marks to 37,000 million marks, with the extension of