Snapple was launched in 1972 in the Greenwich Village area of New York City with its founding product being an all-natural apple juice targeted to health conscious consumers. Over the next 15 years, Snapple grew slowly yet still managed to established markets on both the east and west coasts of the U.S. In the late 1980’s, with revenues reaching about $8 million in 1986, Snapple engaged a beverage industry sales and marketing veteran to professionally manage its next growth trajectory. By establishing a $1 million advertising budget and focusing on strengthening its east coast independent distribution channels, Snapple grew its revenues tenfold to $80 million by 1989. Revenues subsequently reached $231 million in 1992 and Snapple was first
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But when it came to evaluating alternative avenues of corrective actions, Quaker remained true to their overarching corporate culture and management style by focusing on internal brand modifications that included personnel changes in Snapple brand management positions, a 30% reduction in Snapple product flavors, and an increase in the Snapple brand advertising budget; all of which were initiated late enough in the year following Snapple’s acquisition to miss the 1995 summer drink sales opportunities. It was, in part, Quaker’s lack of timely Snapple advertising and lack of focus on new product innovation and marketplace introduction that fueled the momentum behind Snapple’s slide towards the …show more content…
From the consumer vantage point, Snapple felt fun and possessed a carefree personality. Snapple’s consumers related to its winsome package labels, unconventional advertisements, and whimsical flavor names that comprised the Snapple brand family. Quaker, however, could not bring itself to embrace such a culturally different personality in its management structure and, in some ways, handled the Snapple brand as if it were Quaker’s peculiar step child. Alternative solutions to Snapple’s decline under Quaker were doomed to failure because Quaker was simply not equipped for the marriage of such divergent corporate cultures and Quaker’s management was not structured for, or adaptable to, the unbounded vitality of the Snapple brand. In the end, Quaker unconsciously rejected the most fundamental means of survival for the Snapple product line, embracing Snapple’s culture and personality, which only functioned to sentence Snapple to failure under Quaker’s ownership. The result concluded with the sale of Snapple in March of 1997 to Triarc Companies for $300 million and netting a Quaker loss of $1.4 billion in just about 3 years’
But when it came to evaluating alternative avenues of corrective actions, Quaker remained true to their overarching corporate culture and management style by focusing on internal brand modifications that included personnel changes in Snapple brand management positions, a 30% reduction in Snapple product flavors, and an increase in the Snapple brand advertising budget; all of which were initiated late enough in the year following Snapple’s acquisition to miss the 1995 summer drink sales opportunities. It was, in part, Quaker’s lack of timely Snapple advertising and lack of focus on new product innovation and marketplace introduction that fueled the momentum behind Snapple’s slide towards the …show more content…
From the consumer vantage point, Snapple felt fun and possessed a carefree personality. Snapple’s consumers related to its winsome package labels, unconventional advertisements, and whimsical flavor names that comprised the Snapple brand family. Quaker, however, could not bring itself to embrace such a culturally different personality in its management structure and, in some ways, handled the Snapple brand as if it were Quaker’s peculiar step child. Alternative solutions to Snapple’s decline under Quaker were doomed to failure because Quaker was simply not equipped for the marriage of such divergent corporate cultures and Quaker’s management was not structured for, or adaptable to, the unbounded vitality of the Snapple brand. In the end, Quaker unconsciously rejected the most fundamental means of survival for the Snapple product line, embracing Snapple’s culture and personality, which only functioned to sentence Snapple to failure under Quaker’s ownership. The result concluded with the sale of Snapple in March of 1997 to Triarc Companies for $300 million and netting a Quaker loss of $1.4 billion in just about 3 years’