(Heil, 78-79) A further problem with determining the validity of the identity theory is that we don’t know how reality compares with one’s experience: we know that the conscious experience is vastly different from the neurological experience that we can show using MMRIs—some qualities of our consciousness seemingly undetectable. (Heil, 80) In addition to the conscious and neurological experience being different the objective experience can be different, for instance people have hallucinations. (Heil, 82) Objection two is trying to argue that we can’t be confident of how important our brain processes are for thought because our knowledge of neurology is poor and we could be in our theories explaining sensation. If this statement is correct then we are not necessarily reporting brain processes which in turn implies that the brain may not be as important as we thought for experiencing sensations. (Smart,
(Heil, 78-79) A further problem with determining the validity of the identity theory is that we don’t know how reality compares with one’s experience: we know that the conscious experience is vastly different from the neurological experience that we can show using MMRIs—some qualities of our consciousness seemingly undetectable. (Heil, 80) In addition to the conscious and neurological experience being different the objective experience can be different, for instance people have hallucinations. (Heil, 82) Objection two is trying to argue that we can’t be confident of how important our brain processes are for thought because our knowledge of neurology is poor and we could be in our theories explaining sensation. If this statement is correct then we are not necessarily reporting brain processes which in turn implies that the brain may not be as important as we thought for experiencing sensations. (Smart,