Main Body:
Section A:
The Inflexible Truman Administration:
It is highly debated from the American point of view that there was potential for a Sino-American accommodation in 1949. “Warren Cohen and Nancy Tucker have put forward a ‘lost chance’ thesis on the basis of the troublesome CCP-Soviet relationship during the civil war, the Huang-Stuart talks, as well as the department of State’s ‘hands-off’ approach towards Taiwan.” – (Chi-kwan Mark, China and the World Since 1945: An International History, 2003, Pg.17.) However there are several other vital factors that have been excluded from this thesis. The Truman Administration was far too inflexible due to the fact that they were highly influenced by Cold War and domestic politics. This resulted in the CCP and Mao favouring the Soviet Union in relation to political connections and alliances. The inflexibility can be clearly seen within the Truman Administration when there was no rational reason to maintain strong political ties with the GMD as it was apparent that the CCP was going to win the civil war regardless of help from the US. However no singular person wanted to be associated with the acceptance of a communist China and the considered ‘loss’ of a capitalistic China. It cannot be disputed …show more content…
It is apparent that both nations had alternate views on how the economy should be run. The CCP’s idea of communism versus The United States idea of capitalism played a critical role for a Sino-American accommodation in 1949. Hostility and unreceptive behaviour was further augmented between both nations due to the continued support from the US to the GMD. The increased funding and consistent military support further decreased any possibility of a Sino-American accommodation. According to Mao, the primary reason that the Sino-American accommodation was never a lost chance and rather a myth was his principal goals to transform the perception of China being society and not regarded as an international super power. “Even though it might have been possible for Washington to change the concrete course of its China policy (which was highly unlikely given the policy’s complicated background), it would have been impossible for the United States to alter the course and goals of the Chinese revolution, let alone the historical-cultural environment that gave birth to the event” – (Chen Jian, ‘The Myth of America’s “Lost Chance” in China: A Chinese Perspective in Light of New Evidence’, DH 21 (Winter 1997), Pg. 86). Therefore through several major differences between the Chinese Communist Party and the United States, it is obvious that there was no ‘lost chance’