He argues that it is not only not wrong to save David over the five, but it is permissible to do so. It is even permissible to save David just because you like him. He comes to his conclusion in the following ways:
P1. It would be permissible to save David over the five because you like David.
P2. If there is a moral requirement to save the five over David, it is not permissible to save David over the five because of a personal preference.
P3. That you like David is a personal preference.
P4. If there is a moral requirement to save the five over David, it is not permissible to save David over the five because you like David.
P5. If it is permissible to save David over the five because you like David, then there is no moral requirement to save the five over David.
P6. David does nothing wrong in saving himself rather than the five.
P7. If David does nothing wrong in saving himself rather than the five, then you do nothing wrong saving David over the five because you like David.
P8. You do nothing wrong saving David over the five because you like David (P6,