These aforementioned “intrinsic factors” take many forms, but essentially, they are residual byproducts of past experiences, worldviews, backgrounds, sentiments, etc. Think, for example, about the issue of sexual harassment. Men are far more likely to attain information about sexual harassment in a third-person manner: statistics, listening to first-person accounts, etc. Women, however, are far more likely to be victims of sexual harassment; disproportionately, women will have a first-person understanding of sexual harassment. On the whole, therefore, women likely have a vastly different, more intimate understanding of what sexual harassment is. Thus, due to the variety and uniqueness with which men and women may internalize sexual harassment, they likely attach different meanings to the same concept. This phenomenon, in which one concept can be interpreted very differently because subtle, innate differences, is situated knowledge. Situated knowledge will return in this paper’s ultimate analysis of
These aforementioned “intrinsic factors” take many forms, but essentially, they are residual byproducts of past experiences, worldviews, backgrounds, sentiments, etc. Think, for example, about the issue of sexual harassment. Men are far more likely to attain information about sexual harassment in a third-person manner: statistics, listening to first-person accounts, etc. Women, however, are far more likely to be victims of sexual harassment; disproportionately, women will have a first-person understanding of sexual harassment. On the whole, therefore, women likely have a vastly different, more intimate understanding of what sexual harassment is. Thus, due to the variety and uniqueness with which men and women may internalize sexual harassment, they likely attach different meanings to the same concept. This phenomenon, in which one concept can be interpreted very differently because subtle, innate differences, is situated knowledge. Situated knowledge will return in this paper’s ultimate analysis of