Nevertheless, he thinks compatibilists have a better shot because they at least can distinguish between a kleptomaniac and a common thief. A common thief has some sort of local control over the decisions he makes whereas the kleptomaniac cannot help but steal. Smilansky says that hard determinists should feel free to disagree with him and point that all the talk about control and responsibility is groundless. He has already stated that ultimately, we are not free. “That is the human condition: our being reflective, choosing creatures who (except in exceptional circumstances) ought to be treated as responsible agents, and who are allowed to live out the consequences of our choices; but we are at the same time determined beings, operating as we were molded.” I agree with Smilansky’s position that we ought to be treated as responsible agents and should live the consequences of our actions. Though, I feel that such proposals make more sense from a compatibilist point of view. For all we know, compatibilism doesn’t rule out the notion of agent responsibility nor does fully accept libertarian free will. That compatibilism offers a “shallow reasoning” for the notion of unjust punishment does not seem like a sufficient reason to fully dismiss it. Why not fix the shallow reasoning and propose an alternative instead of proposing new view where the motivation is based on fear, that is the fear of failing to have a community of
Nevertheless, he thinks compatibilists have a better shot because they at least can distinguish between a kleptomaniac and a common thief. A common thief has some sort of local control over the decisions he makes whereas the kleptomaniac cannot help but steal. Smilansky says that hard determinists should feel free to disagree with him and point that all the talk about control and responsibility is groundless. He has already stated that ultimately, we are not free. “That is the human condition: our being reflective, choosing creatures who (except in exceptional circumstances) ought to be treated as responsible agents, and who are allowed to live out the consequences of our choices; but we are at the same time determined beings, operating as we were molded.” I agree with Smilansky’s position that we ought to be treated as responsible agents and should live the consequences of our actions. Though, I feel that such proposals make more sense from a compatibilist point of view. For all we know, compatibilism doesn’t rule out the notion of agent responsibility nor does fully accept libertarian free will. That compatibilism offers a “shallow reasoning” for the notion of unjust punishment does not seem like a sufficient reason to fully dismiss it. Why not fix the shallow reasoning and propose an alternative instead of proposing new view where the motivation is based on fear, that is the fear of failing to have a community of