Although it overlaps with Sageman’s arguments, Wiktorowicz’s approach to radicalization is relatively more complex; among other things, he introduces the ‘cognitive opening’ theory, a crisis “that shakes certainty in previously accepted beliefs and renders an individual more receptive to the possibility of alternative views and perspectives.” The crisis can instigate a cognitive opening. This can take a variety of forms, depending on the individual, but when related to Islamic movements, the cognitive openings tend to be “economic (losing a job, blocked mobility), social or cultural (sense of cultural weakness, racism, humiliation), and/or political (repression, torture, political discrimination)” as well as “personal,” ranging from “death
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Having mentioned moral outrage as one of the four prongs in the radicalization by Sageman, Wiktorowicz explains how these tactics are exploited by radical non-violent Islamist organizations. Wiktorowicz explains that Islamist movement’s common outreach tactics are emphasizing “moral shock,” and manipulating the recipients’ outrage into participation with the movement (Wiktorowicz 21). For example, Al-Muhajiroun exhibited “outrageous posts and displays” that were specifically “designed to elicit ‘moral shock’ and outrage,” with the intention of securing “emotional responses” and “sympathy” with their cause (Wiktorowicz 68). Overlapping with Sageman’s second prong, interpreting moral outrage as a war on Islam, Wiktorowicz explains how Al-Muhajiroun played on “this fear by referring to American actions and the more general war on terror as a Christian Crusade against Islam” (Wiktorowicz 109). Aligned with Sageman’s fourth prong of radicalization, mobilization through networks, Wiktorowicz explains how movement activists, through individual outreach to facilitate cognitive openings, utilize their established social networks for recruitment and religious conversion (Wiktorowicz …show more content…
Moreover, during the “war on terror,” as the British government increased surveillance of mosques and added more Muslim organizations to its list of terrorist organizations, British Muslims believed that they would be targeted and prosecuted. Additionally, Wiktorowicz cites a BBC poll conducted in 2002 showing that “70 percent of British Muslims believe that the war on terror is a war on Islam” (Wiktorowicz 109).
Sageman has previously identified religious education as being a bulwark against radicalization, noting in his studies that Islamist terrorists turned to religion later in life. Wiktorowicz stumbles upon the same findings in his study, noting the lack of past religiosity of the activists (Wiktorowicz 102). Sageman, however, explicitly extrapolates from these findings the conclusion that “more religious education for these young men might have been beneficial” (Sageman
Having mentioned moral outrage as one of the four prongs in the radicalization by Sageman, Wiktorowicz explains how these tactics are exploited by radical non-violent Islamist organizations. Wiktorowicz explains that Islamist movement’s common outreach tactics are emphasizing “moral shock,” and manipulating the recipients’ outrage into participation with the movement (Wiktorowicz 21). For example, Al-Muhajiroun exhibited “outrageous posts and displays” that were specifically “designed to elicit ‘moral shock’ and outrage,” with the intention of securing “emotional responses” and “sympathy” with their cause (Wiktorowicz 68). Overlapping with Sageman’s second prong, interpreting moral outrage as a war on Islam, Wiktorowicz explains how Al-Muhajiroun played on “this fear by referring to American actions and the more general war on terror as a Christian Crusade against Islam” (Wiktorowicz 109). Aligned with Sageman’s fourth prong of radicalization, mobilization through networks, Wiktorowicz explains how movement activists, through individual outreach to facilitate cognitive openings, utilize their established social networks for recruitment and religious conversion (Wiktorowicz …show more content…
Moreover, during the “war on terror,” as the British government increased surveillance of mosques and added more Muslim organizations to its list of terrorist organizations, British Muslims believed that they would be targeted and prosecuted. Additionally, Wiktorowicz cites a BBC poll conducted in 2002 showing that “70 percent of British Muslims believe that the war on terror is a war on Islam” (Wiktorowicz 109).
Sageman has previously identified religious education as being a bulwark against radicalization, noting in his studies that Islamist terrorists turned to religion later in life. Wiktorowicz stumbles upon the same findings in his study, noting the lack of past religiosity of the activists (Wiktorowicz 102). Sageman, however, explicitly extrapolates from these findings the conclusion that “more religious education for these young men might have been beneficial” (Sageman