US Army Deputy G2 asked me to assess the operational viability of a wide-area surveillance (WAS) program from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory called SONOMA, which I executed while I also leading the PTDS program. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDRE), OSD AT&L directed US Army to deploy SONOMA’s capability into Iraq within 90 days. I received a technology demonstration and assessed SONOMA would require $25M and 18 months of additional development to adequately operationalize the capability for employment by military personnel. The US Army Deputy G2 informed the DDRE of our assessment, which he accepted. I left the DCS, G2 staff after accepting a promotion at the Department of Homeland Security. Concurrently, RDECOM began operationalizing SONOMA,
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Immediately, I was directed to assume control of the program, assess its status, and then complete and deploy the capability to Iraq for a 90-day operational utility assessment. So, approximately one year after making my original assessment on the program’s readiness, cost and integration challenges – I was now responsible for the program. My first priority was to establish and maintain complete program transparency. My assessment of the program revealed MOHAWK STARE could not field an operational capability on a stable platform, in spite of expending $13M of JIEDDO’s $19M investment. I called the program team together and asserted my leadership and oversight by establishing ground rules moving forward: individual accountability, execute the work objectives as prioritized, meet or exceed all regulations or policies on aircraft airworthiness certifications, vertically and horizontally communicate your work progress. I divided the program into three projects: aircraft and flight worthiness, sensor and processing development and integration, and concept of operations and analysis. I assigned oversight of each project to INSCOM, Arm Research Lab, and the Technical Operations
Immediately, I was directed to assume control of the program, assess its status, and then complete and deploy the capability to Iraq for a 90-day operational utility assessment. So, approximately one year after making my original assessment on the program’s readiness, cost and integration challenges – I was now responsible for the program. My first priority was to establish and maintain complete program transparency. My assessment of the program revealed MOHAWK STARE could not field an operational capability on a stable platform, in spite of expending $13M of JIEDDO’s $19M investment. I called the program team together and asserted my leadership and oversight by establishing ground rules moving forward: individual accountability, execute the work objectives as prioritized, meet or exceed all regulations or policies on aircraft airworthiness certifications, vertically and horizontally communicate your work progress. I divided the program into three projects: aircraft and flight worthiness, sensor and processing development and integration, and concept of operations and analysis. I assigned oversight of each project to INSCOM, Arm Research Lab, and the Technical Operations