Ruth Benedict's Arguments Of Moral Relativity

Ruth Benedict first seeks to demonstrate that perceptions of morality vary between cultures. Only providing one or two examples would evidently be insufficient so we are deluged with many. She dwells on this point, but it is easy enough to grant. However, after wearing us down with these examples, she unexpectedly jumps directly to her conclusion of moral relativity. Unless I am perceiving it incorrectly—which is entirely possible—this is the gist of her argument: cultures have differing views on morality; therefore, morality is relative.
This relies on an assumption that Pojman refers to as the dependency thesis—essentially, that morality is dependent upon its perception. However, this is little more than an assertion. We are given no evidence …show more content…
While—for the sake of argument—it is possible that there is no correct answer, this simply means that one or both of us are mistaken. The same goes for morality. Perspectives on morality may vary between cultures, but this in no way implies the nonexistence of “correct” moral principles. In short, Benedict’s argument is problematic.
While this may disprove her argument for relativity, asserting that her conclusion is thus disproven would be to commit the “fallacy fallacy.” Let us assume her conclusion is true. In this, she essentially equates moral principles to cultural …show more content…
If so, a cultural habit is desirable when it promotes the good of the society, undesirable when harm is the primary effect, and neutral by default. Therefore, every moral principle of a given culture can be classified as healthy, unhealthy, or neutral in relation to that culture. It should be noted that this is still entirely dependent upon the culture; a principle is classified in terms of its “relative” correctness for the culture and the benefits it bestows upon it. Principles in one culture may fit into different buckets than in another culture. What may be “good” for one culture may be “bad” for