casualties on the Russians, showing the rest of the world how weak the Red army was after Stalin’s purges. Britain and France had even briefly considered helping Finland and declaring war against the Soviets. It was clear to Hitler that invading Russia was not only inevitable but also possible. Hitler began preparing for such an invasion, despite the pleas of his generals not to do so. Many of the military advisors in Nazi High Command had served in Russia in World War one, and knew firsthand the problems and dangers of fighting a land war in Russia. They maintained that fighting a sustained ground war would be disastrous and difficult for Germany, whose strategy thus far had been quick, powerful incursions rather than large campaigns. In
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He objected to the current strategy of wide encirclements, arguing that the strength of Blitzkrieg relied on its focus on one objective. On a theater as vast as Russia however, no one objective could be focused on. Furthermore, the “arms” of the Blitzkrieg are supposed to converge on a single target, but as troops moved deeper into the Russia the three army groups grew father apart rather than converging. OKH had also severely underestimated the Russian order of battle. German soldiers began to lose morale as each division they defeated was immediately replaced by another. As more and more Russian divisions came on line the German momentum started to slow. These problems were compounded by the state of German armor. The rough Russian roads and great distances these tanks had to move were taking their toll. More and more tanks were breaking down or had mechanical problems. The winter of 1941 had a devastating effect on German tanks as well. The roads were reduced to muddy quagmires and whole armies were stuck in the mud for months. Many divisions lost up to 60% of their tanks to the mechanical problems caused by the mud. The Russians took advantage of this slowdown to build up defenses and finish moving as much industry and as many factories as they could to the safer areas in the east. The Germans had lost their momentum, and with it their
He objected to the current strategy of wide encirclements, arguing that the strength of Blitzkrieg relied on its focus on one objective. On a theater as vast as Russia however, no one objective could be focused on. Furthermore, the “arms” of the Blitzkrieg are supposed to converge on a single target, but as troops moved deeper into the Russia the three army groups grew father apart rather than converging. OKH had also severely underestimated the Russian order of battle. German soldiers began to lose morale as each division they defeated was immediately replaced by another. As more and more Russian divisions came on line the German momentum started to slow. These problems were compounded by the state of German armor. The rough Russian roads and great distances these tanks had to move were taking their toll. More and more tanks were breaking down or had mechanical problems. The winter of 1941 had a devastating effect on German tanks as well. The roads were reduced to muddy quagmires and whole armies were stuck in the mud for months. Many divisions lost up to 60% of their tanks to the mechanical problems caused by the mud. The Russians took advantage of this slowdown to build up defenses and finish moving as much industry and as many factories as they could to the safer areas in the east. The Germans had lost their momentum, and with it their