Joseph Ellis, a modern day American historian, wrote Revolutionary Summer, an analyzation of the American Revolution. Ellis has a lot of knowledge of the American and British military decisions, and the outcome of the entire revolution. This previous knowledge makes it very difficult for him write a narrative, yet Ellis is able to provide the reader with great detail of both the American and British successes, losses, mistakes, and opinions of the Revolution. Most history books explain the outcome of an event and how it benefited each side. Revolutionary Summer is different in the way that Ellis goes into detail of both sides successes, failures, mistakes, victories, and opinions of American Independence. Ellis highlights that the Americans
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Rather, he criticizes Washington’s military strategy and military decisions: “The council of war also voted to leave 2,000 troops at Fort Washington. This made no strategic sense, since leaving a ‘castle in the rear’ violated every conventional principle of welfare … Washington’s worst tactical blunder of the entire war.” This critization of Fort Washington was only one of Washington's missteps. Ellis explains that the Continental Army was weak, especially when going up against a strong force like the British. When splitting up something that is already weak, it only becomes weaker. A factor that did not help the Americans in the revolution was the size and lack of experience of the Continental Army. Ellis says,“The big difference between the enlisted ment of the British and American armies was age and experience. The typical British soldier was twenty-eight years old, his American counterpart almost eight years younger. And most important, the red coat had seven years of experience as a soldier, while the American had less than six months, and those in several units of the Continental Army had none whatsoever.” …show more content…
However an army can win a battle but the other side could win the war. The Howe brothers waited a lot which led to many missed opportunities. One of the biggest examples of this is evident when Washington was able to move his whole army out of Long Island without the British knowing before it was too late: “The initial response on the British side was utter disbelief that Washington had somehow managed to extract his entire army without being noticed.” The British could have easily devastated the Continental army because once again Washington split up his army, making them even weaker. This was a huge loss for the British and they did not even know how react or respond to it. Ellis says, “He explained that he had delayed his voyage for several weeks in order to inquire instructions as a peace commissioner, but that very delay meant that he had arrived just after the passage of the Declaration of Independence.” This is another example of the “waiting game” that cost the British the opportunity to intervene with the signing of the Declaration of Independence. Had Lord Howe gotten to the colonies sooner, the entire outcome of the revolution could have gone the opposite
Rather, he criticizes Washington’s military strategy and military decisions: “The council of war also voted to leave 2,000 troops at Fort Washington. This made no strategic sense, since leaving a ‘castle in the rear’ violated every conventional principle of welfare … Washington’s worst tactical blunder of the entire war.” This critization of Fort Washington was only one of Washington's missteps. Ellis explains that the Continental Army was weak, especially when going up against a strong force like the British. When splitting up something that is already weak, it only becomes weaker. A factor that did not help the Americans in the revolution was the size and lack of experience of the Continental Army. Ellis says,“The big difference between the enlisted ment of the British and American armies was age and experience. The typical British soldier was twenty-eight years old, his American counterpart almost eight years younger. And most important, the red coat had seven years of experience as a soldier, while the American had less than six months, and those in several units of the Continental Army had none whatsoever.” …show more content…
However an army can win a battle but the other side could win the war. The Howe brothers waited a lot which led to many missed opportunities. One of the biggest examples of this is evident when Washington was able to move his whole army out of Long Island without the British knowing before it was too late: “The initial response on the British side was utter disbelief that Washington had somehow managed to extract his entire army without being noticed.” The British could have easily devastated the Continental army because once again Washington split up his army, making them even weaker. This was a huge loss for the British and they did not even know how react or respond to it. Ellis says, “He explained that he had delayed his voyage for several weeks in order to inquire instructions as a peace commissioner, but that very delay meant that he had arrived just after the passage of the Declaration of Independence.” This is another example of the “waiting game” that cost the British the opportunity to intervene with the signing of the Declaration of Independence. Had Lord Howe gotten to the colonies sooner, the entire outcome of the revolution could have gone the opposite