Philosophers have continually debated over what defines an individual being, and what this means for the world in terms of ethics. I am going to discuss two basic categories of theories on personal identity – a reductionist view through the eyes of Derek Parfit, and a non-reductionist one, namely, the self-interest theory based on the assumption of a Cartesian Pure Ego. Theories of identity similar to the Cartesian pure ego have been an underlying assumption in many belief systems. Many religions base their beliefs on the assumption of a ‘soul’- an entity entirely separate from its simpler components, such as the body, mind, and experiences. This theory of personal identity has had massive implications in the world of ethics because so many
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Derek Parfit uses reductionism to determine a more likely definition of human identity based on facts, rather than simply speculation. The basis of his argument for the impersonal natural of human identity is the simpler components of a human – the brain, body, and experiences. Parfit lays out the criteria posed by Williams for a reductionist view of personal identity: (1) whether a future person is the same as the current person depends on the intrinsic features of the relationship between the original person and the future person, and cannot rely on how someone else acts, and (2) cannot be based on trivial facts due to the significant nature of human identity (Parfit, 267). He describes many examples which do not fit these criteria in order to show that personal identity does not seem to exist separately from the component parts of a person. One example he gives is of his teletransportation to both Mars and Io. If he is teletransported only to Mars, and his body on Earth is destroyed, it can be claimed by a non-reductionist who believes in a separately existing ‘soul’ that the version of Parfit on Mars is truly him. However, Parfit shows that this example proves that this is not the case. It would be possible, given the same technology, to create a copy of his body in two different places. Assuming that personal identity has a transitive property, both …show more content…
He believes that asking questions regarding who someone ‘is’ after a division are empty questions with no answer, and the only questions with true answers are regarding whether the resulting person bears relation R to the original. Parfit defines relation R as having two components – psychological connectedness and psychological continuity. Psychological connectedness is defined as, “the holding of particular direct psychological connections,” and psychological continuity as, “the holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness (Parfit, 206).” An example he uses is the case of ‘lefty’ and ‘righty’. Parfit describes a fictional scenario in which his brain is divided into the two upper hemispheres, each of which is transplanted into one of his identical triplet brothers. Many western philosophers, and people in general, would be tempted to ask the question, ‘which of the two is Derek Parfit’? Many would be tempted to answer that whichever triplet most closely resembles Parfit would be “him.” (Parfit, 257) However, this example of the closest continuer violates both requirements posed by Parfit. Parfit believes that this question does not have an answer, because it presupposes that human identity exists in the first place. He believes that, rather than a separately existing personal identity, a certain type of relationship, namely relation R, is
Derek Parfit uses reductionism to determine a more likely definition of human identity based on facts, rather than simply speculation. The basis of his argument for the impersonal natural of human identity is the simpler components of a human – the brain, body, and experiences. Parfit lays out the criteria posed by Williams for a reductionist view of personal identity: (1) whether a future person is the same as the current person depends on the intrinsic features of the relationship between the original person and the future person, and cannot rely on how someone else acts, and (2) cannot be based on trivial facts due to the significant nature of human identity (Parfit, 267). He describes many examples which do not fit these criteria in order to show that personal identity does not seem to exist separately from the component parts of a person. One example he gives is of his teletransportation to both Mars and Io. If he is teletransported only to Mars, and his body on Earth is destroyed, it can be claimed by a non-reductionist who believes in a separately existing ‘soul’ that the version of Parfit on Mars is truly him. However, Parfit shows that this example proves that this is not the case. It would be possible, given the same technology, to create a copy of his body in two different places. Assuming that personal identity has a transitive property, both …show more content…
He believes that asking questions regarding who someone ‘is’ after a division are empty questions with no answer, and the only questions with true answers are regarding whether the resulting person bears relation R to the original. Parfit defines relation R as having two components – psychological connectedness and psychological continuity. Psychological connectedness is defined as, “the holding of particular direct psychological connections,” and psychological continuity as, “the holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness (Parfit, 206).” An example he uses is the case of ‘lefty’ and ‘righty’. Parfit describes a fictional scenario in which his brain is divided into the two upper hemispheres, each of which is transplanted into one of his identical triplet brothers. Many western philosophers, and people in general, would be tempted to ask the question, ‘which of the two is Derek Parfit’? Many would be tempted to answer that whichever triplet most closely resembles Parfit would be “him.” (Parfit, 257) However, this example of the closest continuer violates both requirements posed by Parfit. Parfit believes that this question does not have an answer, because it presupposes that human identity exists in the first place. He believes that, rather than a separately existing personal identity, a certain type of relationship, namely relation R, is