Indeed, one might argue that men are actually able to make both short-term and long-term planning. This ties in with Kavka’s argument that, actually, people in the state of nature are not in a one-time Prisoner’s Dilemma situation, but they are in a “multiparty Prisoner’s Dilemma” (Kavka,1983: 302). This means that the player is likely to be involved in a series of games in the future, thus the result of a game at present might affect the outcome of another future game. For example, if two players were to ‘keep an alliance’ in the state of nature, and they knew that they would have to engage again with the other person in the future, they would not fail to cooperate, as they know that in the long run they could have benefited from higher payoffs. Consequently, a multiplay prisoner’s dilemma might open up the “possibility of cooperative moves being rational” (Kavka, 1983: 300). Furthermore, it would appear that men are not always involved in high-risk situations, in which one could suffer crucial losses, but also in lower-risk scenarios. Here it may be logical for men to cooperate at first, as a way of educating the other player to be cooperative in the future (Hampton,
Indeed, one might argue that men are actually able to make both short-term and long-term planning. This ties in with Kavka’s argument that, actually, people in the state of nature are not in a one-time Prisoner’s Dilemma situation, but they are in a “multiparty Prisoner’s Dilemma” (Kavka,1983: 302). This means that the player is likely to be involved in a series of games in the future, thus the result of a game at present might affect the outcome of another future game. For example, if two players were to ‘keep an alliance’ in the state of nature, and they knew that they would have to engage again with the other person in the future, they would not fail to cooperate, as they know that in the long run they could have benefited from higher payoffs. Consequently, a multiplay prisoner’s dilemma might open up the “possibility of cooperative moves being rational” (Kavka, 1983: 300). Furthermore, it would appear that men are not always involved in high-risk situations, in which one could suffer crucial losses, but also in lower-risk scenarios. Here it may be logical for men to cooperate at first, as a way of educating the other player to be cooperative in the future (Hampton,