In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant purportedly sets out to bridge the gap between rationalism and empiricism arguing that knowledge exists both a priori and a posteriori; that is through experience (sensible intuition) and independent of experience. In doing so, Kant hopes to get closer to a formal system and/or science of philosophy. Insofar as establishing philosophy as a science is possible, Kant believed that this system could stem from a small set of mutually dependent principles. After having been influenced by Karl Leonhard Reinhold, post-Kantians attempt to derive the same from a single, first principle. (Hence the absolute in absolute idealism.) The single, first principle is coined the absolute because it must precede all other
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Kant refers to this external object as a thing-in-itself (ding an sich), which he claims cannot be directly or immediately known. We can’t have knowledge of things in themselves, because we can only know what is given to us in sensibility (intuition) and thought through concepts. Kant argues the only things in themselves are space and time, which he still argues are merely formal features of how objects are perceived. Fichte introduces a similar philosophy, however, doing away with the contrast between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, takes out the concept of a thing-in-itself. In the preface to the first edition of Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte touches on Kant’s spirit of genius saying that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is filled with deep and profound insight. He also praises Reinhold’s systematic spirit, saying the formality of it all was much more like a science. And in the preface to the second edition, Fichte asserts that a system or science of philosophy requires a combination of Kant and Reinhold in that it contains both critique and science; genius and organization; letter and spirit. Fichte then argues that representations are merely productions of the knowing subject, or the ego. Therefore, deviating from what Kant has asserted, there exists no …show more content…
And in Schlegel’s system, consciousness is neither fact (Reinhold) nor act (Fichte), but rather both fact and act. In the Introduction to Transcendental Philosophy, he calls philosophy an experiment and says it contains uncertainty and fiction. He also asserts that philosophy begins with skepticism. (To Kant, skeptics were merely annoying complainers who showed up every once in a while. For Fichte, skepticism was useful in making progress in philosophy, but isn’t where philosophy begins.) His romanticism is continues in his declaration that one must have enthusiasm and passion for the absolute. The search must continue and never cease until the absolute is reached. The absolute, for Schlegel, being the unity of all knowledge and the midpoint at which all things meet. Keeping in mind the construction of a venn diagram, everything is the same in essence. For Schlegel, knowledge is symbolic and represents divisions. We understand truth in relation to other things (other truths), including what it is not (falsities). In Concerning the Essence of Critique, he calls critique the middle term between history and philosophy. There exists a historical progression (process) of philosophy. According to Schlegel, the Greeks invented critique because they had a sensitivity to poetry and their standards were universal (which they were not). He also argues that the Romans adopted (copied entirely) from the Greeks through
Kant refers to this external object as a thing-in-itself (ding an sich), which he claims cannot be directly or immediately known. We can’t have knowledge of things in themselves, because we can only know what is given to us in sensibility (intuition) and thought through concepts. Kant argues the only things in themselves are space and time, which he still argues are merely formal features of how objects are perceived. Fichte introduces a similar philosophy, however, doing away with the contrast between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, takes out the concept of a thing-in-itself. In the preface to the first edition of Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte touches on Kant’s spirit of genius saying that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is filled with deep and profound insight. He also praises Reinhold’s systematic spirit, saying the formality of it all was much more like a science. And in the preface to the second edition, Fichte asserts that a system or science of philosophy requires a combination of Kant and Reinhold in that it contains both critique and science; genius and organization; letter and spirit. Fichte then argues that representations are merely productions of the knowing subject, or the ego. Therefore, deviating from what Kant has asserted, there exists no …show more content…
And in Schlegel’s system, consciousness is neither fact (Reinhold) nor act (Fichte), but rather both fact and act. In the Introduction to Transcendental Philosophy, he calls philosophy an experiment and says it contains uncertainty and fiction. He also asserts that philosophy begins with skepticism. (To Kant, skeptics were merely annoying complainers who showed up every once in a while. For Fichte, skepticism was useful in making progress in philosophy, but isn’t where philosophy begins.) His romanticism is continues in his declaration that one must have enthusiasm and passion for the absolute. The search must continue and never cease until the absolute is reached. The absolute, for Schlegel, being the unity of all knowledge and the midpoint at which all things meet. Keeping in mind the construction of a venn diagram, everything is the same in essence. For Schlegel, knowledge is symbolic and represents divisions. We understand truth in relation to other things (other truths), including what it is not (falsities). In Concerning the Essence of Critique, he calls critique the middle term between history and philosophy. There exists a historical progression (process) of philosophy. According to Schlegel, the Greeks invented critique because they had a sensitivity to poetry and their standards were universal (which they were not). He also argues that the Romans adopted (copied entirely) from the Greeks through