The main prejudice in this case is that William and the defence were afraid that the jury panel would be biased on the verdict because he was an aboriginal. There are four specific types of prejudices discovered in the case: interest, specific, generic and conformity (R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128. 31. Supreme Court. 04 June 1998. Print). Interest prejudice is when jurors have a direct part in the trial because of their relationship with the defendant or victim (R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128. 31. Supreme Court. 04 June 1998. Print). Specific prejudice is attitudes or beliefs about a specific case which can influence a juror who does not know whether to decide the guilt or innocence (R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128. 31. Supreme
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The Crown argued that the jurors would always have presumptions to act reasonably, which therefore the evidence must include the bias of the jurors that would affect the outcome, therefore when strict evidence would be needed demonstrating prejudice (R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128. 31. Supreme Court. 04 June 1998. Print). While the defence took a distinctive decision, they argued that the “Sherratt”, established that the right to challenge for cause was unnecessary (R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128. 31. Supreme Court. 04 June 1998. Print). Evidence claiming prejudice against William and aboriginals had begun a “realistic potential” for partially, which lead William to question jurors to see if they would be able to set their prejudices aside when distributing the verdict (R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128. 31. Supreme Court. 04 June 1998. Print). In the Parliament, jurors are often seen as unable to set aside their prejudices and act partially, which led the court to reject the argument that prejudice based on pre-trial publicity can be cured by the safeguards in the trial process in Sheratt (R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128. 31. Supreme Court. 04 June 1998. Print). Stated in the Court of Appeal is the existence of a significant degree of racial bias in the community from which the panel was drawn was. An order was held in
The Crown argued that the jurors would always have presumptions to act reasonably, which therefore the evidence must include the bias of the jurors that would affect the outcome, therefore when strict evidence would be needed demonstrating prejudice (R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128. 31. Supreme Court. 04 June 1998. Print). While the defence took a distinctive decision, they argued that the “Sherratt”, established that the right to challenge for cause was unnecessary (R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128. 31. Supreme Court. 04 June 1998. Print). Evidence claiming prejudice against William and aboriginals had begun a “realistic potential” for partially, which lead William to question jurors to see if they would be able to set their prejudices aside when distributing the verdict (R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128. 31. Supreme Court. 04 June 1998. Print). In the Parliament, jurors are often seen as unable to set aside their prejudices and act partially, which led the court to reject the argument that prejudice based on pre-trial publicity can be cured by the safeguards in the trial process in Sheratt (R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128. 31. Supreme Court. 04 June 1998. Print). Stated in the Court of Appeal is the existence of a significant degree of racial bias in the community from which the panel was drawn was. An order was held in