The GTV was introduced as part of the 1983 electoral reforms in an attempt to reduce the informal vote in the senate (Galligan 1985). Since its incorporation into the electoral system, voters have increasingly used the GTV rather than filling out preferences below the line. Major party voters tend to use it in greater numbers (Ghazarian 2012). The GTV introduced an influential feature of the Senate contest; preference deals/harvesting (Ghazarian 2012). The minor and major parties can now make preference deals with each other within the same chamber or across the chambers. This has become increasingly relevant to the final outcomes in the Shouse of Representatives as the number of seats that are determined by preferences (i.e. not from the first count) has progressively increased from just 12 percent in the 1950s to an astounding 54 percent in 2001 (Farrell & McAllister 2006). Similarly, Farrel and McAllister (2006) note that from the period of 1996 to 2004, voters who decided their own preferences in the House of Representatives averaged 48 percent. This implies that roughly half of the votes followed the parties’ own preferences giving the parties increased control. However, this should bear in mind that some voters only choose to follow the how-to-vote card after they have approved the candidate order offered. On average, less than 10 precent of seats in the House of Representatives have had their outcomes changed as a result of preferences flow (Farrell & McAllister 2006). In comparison, preferences in the Senate have a profound effect on candidates
The GTV was introduced as part of the 1983 electoral reforms in an attempt to reduce the informal vote in the senate (Galligan 1985). Since its incorporation into the electoral system, voters have increasingly used the GTV rather than filling out preferences below the line. Major party voters tend to use it in greater numbers (Ghazarian 2012). The GTV introduced an influential feature of the Senate contest; preference deals/harvesting (Ghazarian 2012). The minor and major parties can now make preference deals with each other within the same chamber or across the chambers. This has become increasingly relevant to the final outcomes in the Shouse of Representatives as the number of seats that are determined by preferences (i.e. not from the first count) has progressively increased from just 12 percent in the 1950s to an astounding 54 percent in 2001 (Farrell & McAllister 2006). Similarly, Farrel and McAllister (2006) note that from the period of 1996 to 2004, voters who decided their own preferences in the House of Representatives averaged 48 percent. This implies that roughly half of the votes followed the parties’ own preferences giving the parties increased control. However, this should bear in mind that some voters only choose to follow the how-to-vote card after they have approved the candidate order offered. On average, less than 10 precent of seats in the House of Representatives have had their outcomes changed as a result of preferences flow (Farrell & McAllister 2006). In comparison, preferences in the Senate have a profound effect on candidates