I. Introduction The images of the al-Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001 are some of the most powerful in propaganda history. Using "passenger airplanes as missiles," al-Qaeda targeted the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington D.C., and a field in Somerset, Pennsylvania (Oxford). It seemed to the public the United States faced a massive crisis of national security, and, consequently, an impending war. Of course, public chaos was inevitable, and propaganda was necessary to unite us as "Americans" and support the national cause. But how did a presidential administration justify entering a war without any concrete evidence that weapons of mass destruction existed or any precisely articulated objective? What made the
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The Bush administration needed propaganda's convincing power in order to gain public support for what would become a one of the longest wars in America's history. The campaign was, in many respects, quite effective, as various forms of black (propaganda for which the source is not known), white (propaganda for which the source is clearly known), and gray (propaganda for which the source may or may not be disclosed or legitimate) propaganda to create stereotypes, a new vocabulary of terrorism, and a sense of nationalism and American identity still in place over a decade later. The campaign, like most, did have its weaknesses, including the failure to provide one uniform message throughout the extended time of conflict. This paper will assume limited effects theory to examine the campaign qualitatively in order to scrutinize the complexities of its efficacy. This analysis will be limited to George W. Bush's first term in office from 2001-2004, and it will take into account both the campaign’s strengths and weaknesses. Ultimately, the goal is to gain greater understanding of this campaign's use of propaganda principles and the extent of this …show more content…
Rampton and Stauber address the efficacy of the Administration’s approach in their assertion that "The paradox of the American war in Iraq, however, is that perception management has been much more successful at 'influencing' the 'emotions, motives, and objective reasoning' of the American people than it has been at reaching 'foreign audiences'" (5). It's clear that international powers were opposed to actions of the Administration, as they moved to imperialistic action regardless of the UN's advice. As Carpenter states in his argument about the increasing disapproval of the international community: "European powers [had] to tolerate an increasing arrogant 'take it or leave it' attitude on the part of the US leaders" (520). This echoes what Ikenberry states in his argument about American imperialism: "[T]he United States ha[d] decided that it [was] big enough, powerful enough, and remote enough to go it alone"
The Bush administration needed propaganda's convincing power in order to gain public support for what would become a one of the longest wars in America's history. The campaign was, in many respects, quite effective, as various forms of black (propaganda for which the source is not known), white (propaganda for which the source is clearly known), and gray (propaganda for which the source may or may not be disclosed or legitimate) propaganda to create stereotypes, a new vocabulary of terrorism, and a sense of nationalism and American identity still in place over a decade later. The campaign, like most, did have its weaknesses, including the failure to provide one uniform message throughout the extended time of conflict. This paper will assume limited effects theory to examine the campaign qualitatively in order to scrutinize the complexities of its efficacy. This analysis will be limited to George W. Bush's first term in office from 2001-2004, and it will take into account both the campaign’s strengths and weaknesses. Ultimately, the goal is to gain greater understanding of this campaign's use of propaganda principles and the extent of this …show more content…
Rampton and Stauber address the efficacy of the Administration’s approach in their assertion that "The paradox of the American war in Iraq, however, is that perception management has been much more successful at 'influencing' the 'emotions, motives, and objective reasoning' of the American people than it has been at reaching 'foreign audiences'" (5). It's clear that international powers were opposed to actions of the Administration, as they moved to imperialistic action regardless of the UN's advice. As Carpenter states in his argument about the increasing disapproval of the international community: "European powers [had] to tolerate an increasing arrogant 'take it or leave it' attitude on the part of the US leaders" (520). This echoes what Ikenberry states in his argument about American imperialism: "[T]he United States ha[d] decided that it [was] big enough, powerful enough, and remote enough to go it alone"