The second element is that the promisee must …show more content…
This burden is not met if the promise is revoked or retracted before the promise is acted on. In this case, Jeremy knew that the promise had been revoked, when the executor of the estate informed him that Aunt Jenni’s promise would not be honored. Jeremy, even after knowing that the promise may not be fulfilled, resigned and paid the tuition. Since the offer had already been revoked, Jeremy had no reason to justifiably rely on his Aunt Jennie’s $40,000 promise. Within the facts given, this burden is not likely to have been met.
This aspect of the case is similar to the case of Alden v. Presely. In which it was found that the appellee did not detrimentally rely on the promise because the estate had already informed her that they did not intend to carry out the promisors promise to pay her . Just like in the current case, in Alden, the promisee knew that the initial promise may not have come to fruition after the death of the promisor yet continued to act on the promise nonetheless. Just like in Alden, Jeremy is unlike to succeed in receiving the money in …show more content…
Since Jeremy substantially relied on Aunt Jennies promise when making the deposit and he met the third promissory estopple requirement of facing a detriment, he may be eligible to receive compensatory damages. In this case, the estate would likely owe Jeremy $500 but not $40,000.
2. The issue in this case is whether res ipsa loquitur should be applied in the instance of a fire in a hotel room. Res ipsa loquitur requires that four distinct requirements be met. The first requirement is that there can be no direct evidence of the defendant’s conduct. In the current case, this burden is fulfilled. Since, presumably, no one was in the room when the fire started, there can be no direct evidence of the defendant’s actions or inactions that may have caused the fire. The only evidence that can be offered is circumstantial.
The second requirement is that the action seldom occurs without negligence. Fires, very rarely, start without some form of negligence. Whether that negligence be a lit cigarette left behind, faulty wiring or overuse of outlets, a fire must have some negligence attached to it. As mentioned in Olswanger v. Funk, “a fire does not ordinarily originate in a couch in an apartment in the absence of negligence ”. Although the Olswanger case concerned an apartment and the current case pertains to a hotel, the facts are similar enough to justify a comparison. Thus, the second requirement of res