In 2002, “50 percent of recipient families and 90 percent of two-parent families were required to be working or in work preparation programs” (Blank). States, however, had great discretion to alter these programs according to their needs. Receiving a credit based on caseload reductions, states earned exemptions that reduced the number of recipients required to work (Tanner). Since welfare rolls significantly dropped, approximately 67 percent since the ‘96 reform, “the average effective minimum work participation in 2006 was five percent for all families and 18.7 percent for two-parent families” (Tanner). Astonishingly, only 21 states had an effective work rate higher than ten percent and 17 states plus two territories had a work rate of zero, showing large exemptions in all states from work requirements (Tanner). In 2009, after all of the credits and exemptions, a total of only 32 percent of recipients participated in working activities (Tanner). However, working activities did not necessarily mean having a job. The term included simply looking for a job and, therefore, allowed job searching recipients to keep their benefits (Tanner). Since the ‘96 reform, “most states are not really required to make a large number of recipients work, and few have chosen to do so” …show more content…
AFDC made many welfare recipients feel trapped into a permanent dependency on aid, and the time limit provoked welfare as a way of life (Tanner). No matter how many times a family was or is on welfare, PRWORA set a lifetime limit of 60 months or five years (Blank). Unfortunately, just like any other changes the PRWORA set into effect, the states could design the new rules to their benefit, such as setting shorter time limits or exempting recipients (Tanner). Also degrading the federal boundary, states were somehow allowed to exempt 20 percent of caseloads from the time limit and to use some of their own funds to extend families time on welfare who exceeded the federal five years (Blank). Another exemption from time limits are children only cases, “where the child is eligible for welfare benefits, but the adult is not” (Tanner). Accounting for about half of the total caseloads classified as children only, these cases become a huge issue to how much is being spent on welfare (Tanner) which the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities stated that in the 2015 budget, nearly 362 billion taxpayers’ dollars, about ten percent, was spent to fund “safety net programs” or means-tested welfare programs (“Policy