1. Purpose. The purpose of this paper is to identify Reserve Component (RC) operational requirements and the shortfalls of the current pre-mobilization 39-day training model with recommendations to mitigate capacity and capability gaps.
2. Key Points. a. The Army’s global operational requirements and the constant resizing, re-balancing, and restructuring of the total force directed in recent TAA’s, including 10-15, 12-17, and 18-21, have generated an increased demand for RC forces availability, readiness, and utilization. However, there is no mention of additional resources allocated for pre-mobilization training to maximize RC capabilities. b. DoD policy requires the RC to provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet defense requirements across the full spectrum …show more content…
Under the current Army force structure, the RC provides over half of the Army’s total capacity. Having a ready and reliable RC to meet the joint force capability requirements is becoming increasingly important as the Army continues to downsize the AC force and implement force management reforms found in TAA 18-21, which delivers an executable program supporting a 980k force for execution beginning in FY16 and achieving 980k NLT FY17, in addition to some operational forces redesign across components.
b. Strategically, one approach to lower risk without growing end-strength is through greater utilization of the RC forces, thus justifying the need to maintain an operational reserve to complement the AC force in order to deliver the right capabilities to the GCCs. However, the current RC 39-day training model does not support the demands of an operational reserve as designed. The 39-day model was originally designed to support the needs of a strategic reserve after World War II, rendering the model obsolete to generate the necessary readiness requirements of an operational