Political And Political Factors In Egypt And The Iranian Revolution

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Egypt seemed to be a nation ready for the influence of the Revolution to take hold with a firm grasp. It was accepted by many revolutionary thinkers that “Egypt [was] in a very critical condition” and that “Egyptians [had] looked to the West and then to the East and then to Arab nationalism without finding the answer to their problems” both socially and economically. Additionally, Ibrahim Yazidi, the Deputy Prime Minister for Revolutionary Affairs of Iran, predicted, correctly, that Egypt would be a part of “an ongoing Islamic ideological revolution.” As the support and spread of the Revolution’s ideals continued to reach the Muslim populations of Egypt, a remarkable yet familiar development dominated its narrative. Groups such as the Muslim …show more content…
Iranian officials themselves too saw the Muslim Brotherhood and the unity of Sunni and Shi’a Muslims as the key to success in Egypt and beyond. The unrest and emotional responses tugged at in the minds of the Muslims of Egypt never truly culminated in a direct revolt against the Presidency that opposed many of the messages of the Iranian Revolution. Still, the effect of the Iranian Revolution should not and cannot go unnoticed in the narrative of the late 1970’s and 1980’s in Egypt. The rise of Islamic organizations in Egypt is due directly toward the empowerment that accompanied the revolutionary enthusiasm. While the political stature of Islamic actors in Egypt prior to the mid-1970’s had waned significantly, both mainstream groups in Egypt, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Jihad, and less prominent Islamic groups enjoyed increased political significance and influence, due to the popularity of the Iranian Revolution on the Arabic …show more content…
This was a recurrent theme of the storyline of the late and early times after the culmination of the Iranian Revolution. As the Herat Uprising was reported in the media outlets across the world covering the intensely rising situations in the Middle East, Iran took great exception to the claim that it directly attempted to export its Islamic state goals. Despite the aforementioned public offer by Ayatollah Shariat Madari of Iran, to assist the rebels in Herat toward their revolt against the Republic and Soviet influence in Afghanistan, Iran disputed any such claim. While the Afghan government said that Iran sent thousands of soldiers in disguise to make trouble across the border in Afghanistan, Iran denied any such involvement. Saying that it was “false from top to bottom” that Iran sent soldiers to accompany returning Afghan refugees, Iran attempted to uphold its integrity and stay out of publically disrupting the internal affairs of its neighboring countries. However, in contradictory fashion, the refugees themselves argued against this Iranian claim. In Egypt, too, Iran denies any direct ulterior exportation actions that contributed to the increased activity of Islamic groups. While evidence is hard to establish indicting Iran

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