Deflating queerness
Before contesting the conceptual claim, it would be pertinent to clarify the types of value that are considered by Mackie tout court. Subsequently, the following criteria will be used as a guide by which to assess the plausibility of Mackie’s conceptual claim. The following represents what shall be referred to as the Mackiean moral value criterion (MMV) and includes the following options;
MMV
1. MV is true of x, regardless of x’s desires, purpose, motivation and reasons (subjective nature).
2. MV is true of x, regardless of x’s social context.
3. MV is true of x, regardless of x’s status.
Although the MMV does not represent a linear spectrum of relative ‘objectivity’ and ‘categoricity’, at a glance, it is clear to see (intuitively at least) that the degree of both objectivity and categoricity increase in ascending order.
Immediately, option 3) appears extreme and would entail the following. MV would provide reason and motivation to x even if x was taken to be a rock, a flower, a cat, or a psychopath for example. If we were to grant this possibility a causal constraint would ensue. For example, how could it be that a moral imperative has the capacity to motivate and/or provide x with a reason to φ without constraining x’s psychological (if x is a cognizer), biological, chemical, or physical imperative? For a moral value to be categorically prescriptive regardless of an agents status would entail it to be intrinsically reason-giving and motivational, and …show more content…
It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is not merely that the two features occur together. The wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’, or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’? (Mackie 1990 [1977], pp.
Before contesting the conceptual claim, it would be pertinent to clarify the types of value that are considered by Mackie tout court. Subsequently, the following criteria will be used as a guide by which to assess the plausibility of Mackie’s conceptual claim. The following represents what shall be referred to as the Mackiean moral value criterion (MMV) and includes the following options;
MMV
1. MV is true of x, regardless of x’s desires, purpose, motivation and reasons (subjective nature).
2. MV is true of x, regardless of x’s social context.
3. MV is true of x, regardless of x’s status.
Although the MMV does not represent a linear spectrum of relative ‘objectivity’ and ‘categoricity’, at a glance, it is clear to see (intuitively at least) that the degree of both objectivity and categoricity increase in ascending order.
Immediately, option 3) appears extreme and would entail the following. MV would provide reason and motivation to x even if x was taken to be a rock, a flower, a cat, or a psychopath for example. If we were to grant this possibility a causal constraint would ensue. For example, how could it be that a moral imperative has the capacity to motivate and/or provide x with a reason to φ without constraining x’s psychological (if x is a cognizer), biological, chemical, or physical imperative? For a moral value to be categorically prescriptive regardless of an agents status would entail it to be intrinsically reason-giving and motivational, and …show more content…
It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is not merely that the two features occur together. The wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’, or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’? (Mackie 1990 [1977], pp.