Singer’s (1978) argument is recognised as one …show more content…
“If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (Singer, 1978, p.X). “We have income we can give up without giving up the necessities of life” (Singer, 1978, p.X). Therefore, we ought to survive on the necessities and give the rest of our money to charity. It would be “morally callous” (Raley, 2005, p.X) to deny the first premise and there is a strong degree of truth in the third premise. The error, I believe, lies in the second premise and I shall try to demonstrate that.
Singer’s (1978) theory of marginal utility is too demanding for most of us. To live at marginal utility would require a drastic change in our lifestyle and to be continuously working to prevent starvation. Singer (1978) acknowledges that if we were all to do our fair share, than we could easily solve world hunger, but he realises that this is “impossible” (p.X) and so he advocates a stronger principle, to live at marginal utility. To show that we have an obligation to do only our fair share, even if it means that others won’t, we must analyse who the obligation is …show more content…
Singer, Peter, (1972) "Famine, affluence, and morality”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, (pp.229-243).
White, M. D., (2013) “Moral Judgment, in Superman and Philosophy: What Would the Man of Steel Do?” (ed M. D. White), John Wiley & Sons, Oxford. doi: 10.1002/9781118541821.ch1
Wolf, S. (2009), “Moral obligations and social commands”, In S. Newlands & L. M. Jorgensen (Eds.), “Metaphysics and the good: Themes from the philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams” (pp. 343–367), New York: Oxford University Press.
obligation definition - http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/obligation
2. Is the failure of those in affluent countries to do more to prevent starvation in other parts of the world a serious moral wrong? (Answer with reference to Peter