Personal Identity theories hold a great deal of interest for metaphysical and ethical philosophers. Many attempt to determine wherein diachronic personal identity exists. Bernard Williams presents multiple thought experiments regarding personal identity in his chapter titled “The Self and the Future”. His thought experiments attempt to provoke answers to questions of personal identity. He presents situations in which bodies and brains are switched, and then asks the question, whose well-being ought I to be concerned with. By invoking concern, Williams is able to make the reader directly interact with the thought experiments, and, as Nozick points out, tend to come the conclusion “that the people have switched bodies” (Nozick 93). Robert Nozick
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The problem present with the closest continuer theory is determining what has more value; spatiotemporal continuity, continuity of body matter, or psychological continuity. In the first example, Williams presents a case in which A-body person and B-body person seemingly switch psychological continuity. The B-body person is now alike the A person in terms of manners, memories, and thought processes. Williams often refers to this case as “body switching” (Williams 75), which in turn presupposes our conclusions about where identity resides. Using the closest continuer theory, the possibilities are no longer limited to psychological continuity, and can instead can include a spatiotemporal continuity. It is now possible to say that the A person remained in the A-body since that body has remained through the change. While you will end up with the same result that Williams suggests in his chapter if you hold that the most important substance for close continuation is psychological continuity, there seem to be many more valid options using Nozick’s schema, which in turn, makes his approach seem …show more content…
Nozick discusses many cases in which the closest continuer theory can be applied. The most troubling case however, is the overlap case that Nozick creates for himself. In this example “half of an ill person’s brain is removed and transplanted into another body, but the original body plus half-brain does not expire when this is being done” (Nozick 105). In this case, the ill body and half-brain survive for an indeterminate amount of time. The ill body does end up dying a considerable amount of time prior to the death of the new transplanted body. This overlap case is difficult to analyse for a multiplicity of reasons. Nozick’s examples are left open-ended whereas Williams’ steps leave no room for interpretation. Nozick writes that the time that both bodies exist is unknown, implying that time has no factor in the in the closest continuer theory. Nozick’s overlap case also claims that the state of the ill bodied person is indeterminate as well. Nozick writes that this person lives on, either unconscious or fully conscious
The problem present with the closest continuer theory is determining what has more value; spatiotemporal continuity, continuity of body matter, or psychological continuity. In the first example, Williams presents a case in which A-body person and B-body person seemingly switch psychological continuity. The B-body person is now alike the A person in terms of manners, memories, and thought processes. Williams often refers to this case as “body switching” (Williams 75), which in turn presupposes our conclusions about where identity resides. Using the closest continuer theory, the possibilities are no longer limited to psychological continuity, and can instead can include a spatiotemporal continuity. It is now possible to say that the A person remained in the A-body since that body has remained through the change. While you will end up with the same result that Williams suggests in his chapter if you hold that the most important substance for close continuation is psychological continuity, there seem to be many more valid options using Nozick’s schema, which in turn, makes his approach seem …show more content…
Nozick discusses many cases in which the closest continuer theory can be applied. The most troubling case however, is the overlap case that Nozick creates for himself. In this example “half of an ill person’s brain is removed and transplanted into another body, but the original body plus half-brain does not expire when this is being done” (Nozick 105). In this case, the ill body and half-brain survive for an indeterminate amount of time. The ill body does end up dying a considerable amount of time prior to the death of the new transplanted body. This overlap case is difficult to analyse for a multiplicity of reasons. Nozick’s examples are left open-ended whereas Williams’ steps leave no room for interpretation. Nozick writes that the time that both bodies exist is unknown, implying that time has no factor in the in the closest continuer theory. Nozick’s overlap case also claims that the state of the ill bodied person is indeterminate as well. Nozick writes that this person lives on, either unconscious or fully conscious