PEA looks at the relationship between economics and politics embedded in the societal context. As it is concerned with the interactions with power, the distribution of wealth and the way these processes are shaped over time (DFID: 2009). This can give donor institutions an edge over policy issues in to allow the better interpretation of risk and reward. I will construct the argument that PEA is central for linking political analysis wider institutional processes within society. PEA provides a framework to apply a deeper level of understanding about power, state capability and responsiveness (McLoughlin: 2014). Through the integration of politics and economics, PEA allows the adoption of a multifaceted approach to understanding the political
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PEA frameworks can be applicable to understanding not only the specific political contexts of loan receiving nations, but also loan giving entities. The ABSM employs economic theory such as game theory and rational choice theory in order to discern corruption, rather than actually looking into the political processes of corruption. The push for good governance, transparency and accountability are important to creating good economic policy. However, I will argue that working with a distinct emphasis on political and economic reform will render the ABSM ineffective. It is known that policies are more likely to succeed when they are well received by nations and reflect the interests of the borrower countries. Employing a PEA framework allows a better understanding of the underlying process of economic development in context. Then, by adopting a PEA framework, and opening up the process to the view of the public will allow the creation of a politically informed and transparent anti-corruption …show more content…
The bank’s anti-corruption approach – exemplified in the ABSM – extracts key actors from a political regime, in order to decentralise power and better meet the needs of the masses through the process of deliberation. Yet, in the case of the ABSM: which actors are utilising agency in the creation of these structures and, moreover, who will the reform structures benefit? The introduction of the ABSM illustrates the Bank wants change. Then, in order to implement anti-corruption reforms we must ask itself the central question: who can create change, and who can stop it? The short answer is that state has the power to make institutional change, and actors on the ground can help create a façade of changing democratic practise through deliberation in the process of power. This satisfies in the simple context of the deliberative process: it is necessary to pass the ‘governance’ role on to members of from parliament, NGO’s and civil society. This empowerment however, should not be taken for granted. Then, we must question, what are the politics which led us
PEA frameworks can be applicable to understanding not only the specific political contexts of loan receiving nations, but also loan giving entities. The ABSM employs economic theory such as game theory and rational choice theory in order to discern corruption, rather than actually looking into the political processes of corruption. The push for good governance, transparency and accountability are important to creating good economic policy. However, I will argue that working with a distinct emphasis on political and economic reform will render the ABSM ineffective. It is known that policies are more likely to succeed when they are well received by nations and reflect the interests of the borrower countries. Employing a PEA framework allows a better understanding of the underlying process of economic development in context. Then, by adopting a PEA framework, and opening up the process to the view of the public will allow the creation of a politically informed and transparent anti-corruption …show more content…
The bank’s anti-corruption approach – exemplified in the ABSM – extracts key actors from a political regime, in order to decentralise power and better meet the needs of the masses through the process of deliberation. Yet, in the case of the ABSM: which actors are utilising agency in the creation of these structures and, moreover, who will the reform structures benefit? The introduction of the ABSM illustrates the Bank wants change. Then, in order to implement anti-corruption reforms we must ask itself the central question: who can create change, and who can stop it? The short answer is that state has the power to make institutional change, and actors on the ground can help create a façade of changing democratic practise through deliberation in the process of power. This satisfies in the simple context of the deliberative process: it is necessary to pass the ‘governance’ role on to members of from parliament, NGO’s and civil society. This empowerment however, should not be taken for granted. Then, we must question, what are the politics which led us