Pearl Harbor Case Analysis

The Hawaiian Department had received a warning about the possibility of increased aggression, following the U.S. placed sanctions on Japan. The Navy, on October 16th, 1941, sent Admiral Kimmel the message; however, Washington disagreed with the Navy's alarm. Therefore, the War Department sent a supplementary message to General Douglas MacArthur and General Short that stated, "Tension between United States and Japan remains strained . . . no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent." Consequently, no actions were taken by the commanders. The U.S. and Japan continued with peace talks, but no real progress was being made. On the November 24th, 1941, the President and Secretary of State Hull had come to the decision that there no realistic chance for a productive outcome of the negotiations. Admiral Stark and General Marshall immediately drafted a joint dispatch to the senior Army and Navy commanders in the Philippines. The message was sent to the senior Navy commanders in the Philippines. Although Admiral Kimmel was included in the message sent, the message warned of "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction" by Japanese forces, "including an attack on the Philippines or Guam." …show more content…
Admiral Yamamoto knew that air supremacy would be crucial to Japan’s overall victory in the Pacific, therefore, he declared the carriers his number one priority. As stated above, Japan knew they needed to improve in their tactics if the mission were to be a success. As a result, they started intense training approximately 6-months before the raid. To illustrates, the pilots where training 10-12 hours a day, the Horizontal bombers, flying Nakajima B5N2 Type 97s, raised their accuracy at 10-15,000 feet by 40%. Their dive bombers, known as Aichi D3A1 Type 99s, increased their accuracy by nearly