The initial U.S. military campaign strategy for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) failed to properly plan for the US political end state of a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. Fortunately, the knowledge and experiences gained from combat operations in OIF, coupled with the concepts of operational design, led to an improved “surge” strategy in 2007. In fact, reassessment of kinetic operations in 2006 led tactics to transition from “clear and leave” to “clear and hold” in 2007. This clear and hold tactic, and many others, formed the cornerstone of current US counterinsurgency doctrine and defined the “surge”. Notwithstanding, evaluation of the initial approach and planning against current US doctrine exposes multiple shortcomings, most notably, a poor understanding
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Rumsfeld’s incorrect end state was regime change followed by the transition of Iraqi security to the remaining intact Iraqi organizations to ensure the future of Iraq. According to Michael O’Hanlon, Secretary Rumsfeld “may share some of the responsibility for the previously mentioned mistake…, but war planners generally do not.” In fact, Cobra II asserted Rumsfeld did not trust the generals to send the minimum force needed to win and secure the peace” in Iraq. Thus, Rumsfeld did not allow General Franks to develop the correct solution to the right problem. Therefore, Gen Franks defined success as, “regime leadership and power base destroyed; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability destroyed or controlled; territorial integrity intact; ability to threaten neighbors eliminated; and an acceptable provisional/permanent government in place.” In addition, both Rumsfeld and Gen Franks suffered from a similar characteristic, neither one wanted help from others nor did they think they needed it. This shared character flaw between top civilian and military leaders allowed both to define the problem too narrowly. Instead of success as the removal of Saddam and his ruling party (very narrow), a better, and more broadly defined problem would show success as an acceptable, …show more content…
President Bush changed his leadership team. Admiral Fallen replaced General Abizaid as US Central Commander. Gen Petraeus replaced Gen Casey as the Commander of Security Forces In Iraq. Secretary Gates replaced Secretary Rumsfeld. One of the last key positional changes was Ambassador Ryan Crocker replacing Zalmay Khalizad. Unlike the previous two Ambassadors Paul Bremer and John Negroponte, Khalizad’s term as Ambassador of Iraq was successful. Secretary Powel once stated that Khalizad was, “the only guy who knew the Iraqi players well and who was regarded by them as a trusted representative of the White House.” Regardless, Ryan and Petraeus now formed the winning civil-military team to change the negative course in
Rumsfeld’s incorrect end state was regime change followed by the transition of Iraqi security to the remaining intact Iraqi organizations to ensure the future of Iraq. According to Michael O’Hanlon, Secretary Rumsfeld “may share some of the responsibility for the previously mentioned mistake…, but war planners generally do not.” In fact, Cobra II asserted Rumsfeld did not trust the generals to send the minimum force needed to win and secure the peace” in Iraq. Thus, Rumsfeld did not allow General Franks to develop the correct solution to the right problem. Therefore, Gen Franks defined success as, “regime leadership and power base destroyed; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability destroyed or controlled; territorial integrity intact; ability to threaten neighbors eliminated; and an acceptable provisional/permanent government in place.” In addition, both Rumsfeld and Gen Franks suffered from a similar characteristic, neither one wanted help from others nor did they think they needed it. This shared character flaw between top civilian and military leaders allowed both to define the problem too narrowly. Instead of success as the removal of Saddam and his ruling party (very narrow), a better, and more broadly defined problem would show success as an acceptable, …show more content…
President Bush changed his leadership team. Admiral Fallen replaced General Abizaid as US Central Commander. Gen Petraeus replaced Gen Casey as the Commander of Security Forces In Iraq. Secretary Gates replaced Secretary Rumsfeld. One of the last key positional changes was Ambassador Ryan Crocker replacing Zalmay Khalizad. Unlike the previous two Ambassadors Paul Bremer and John Negroponte, Khalizad’s term as Ambassador of Iraq was successful. Secretary Powel once stated that Khalizad was, “the only guy who knew the Iraqi players well and who was regarded by them as a trusted representative of the White House.” Regardless, Ryan and Petraeus now formed the winning civil-military team to change the negative course in