Operation HUSKY, the Allied invasion of Sicily launched in July of 1943 was one of the largest joint operations of the Second World War. By mid-August, the Allies captured Messina, the campaign’s key strategic objective. A literal as well as a developmental stepping-stone between the Allies’ victory in North Africa and the invasion of Hitler’s Fortress Europe, HUSKY was an important Allied victory. However, it was an imperfect victory, diminished by the escape of over 100,000 Axis soldiers. An evaluation of HUSKY shows the nascent Allied command was not yet proficient in the integration of joint functions. Allied command and control (C2) during HUSKY was ineffective when evaluated against the mission command attributes of commander’s intent,
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Eisenhower was the Allied Commander in Chief for HUSKY. His principle deputies were all British. Admiral Cunningham commanded naval forces. Air Marshal Tedder commanded air forces. General Alexander was dual-hatted as Eisenhower’s deputy and the ground forces commander. Montgomery and Patton each commanded a joint task force under Alexander. The geographic separation of the key decision makers and the commander’s preoccupation with current operations in North Africa hampered planning for HUSKY. The lack of active leadership from either Eisenhower or Alexander during the planning process debilitated the process resulting in “near paralysis over HUSKY.” This lack of leadership allowed inter-Allied and inter-service rivalries prevalent during the Africa campaign to continue during HUSKY planning. The safe dispersion of the fleet was Cunningham’s primary concern, while Tedder fixated on capturing airfields for his aircraft. Montgomery insisted on concentrating ground forces for mutual support. Eisenhower’s tendency to “rule on plans developed by his staff” rather than provide definitive guidance, left a leadership vacuum. Montgomery finally proposed an invasion plan acceptable to all, first outlined to Bedell Smith on a latrine mirror. Eisenhower and Alexander accepted Montgomery’s plan to concentrate the Allied landings in southeastern Sicily, drive inland to capture airfields and …show more content…
“Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until mission accomplishment.” Effective sustainment allows the commander flexibility and operational reach to “seize, retain and exploit the initiative.” HUSKY, the largest amphibious operation of the war was a huge logistical challenge. Allied planners estimated Allied forces required 6,000 tons of supplies per day. A U.S. Navy action report in 1943 asserted “constant and harmonious planning” between the Allied joint force occurred to deal with the logistical challenges. The Allies learned from amphibious operations in Africa and developed new sustainment organizations and equipment for HUSKY, including “Base Sections” (a sustainment element) and the new amphibious DUKW transport. The Seventh Army landed 11,824 men, 21,512 vehicles and 104,734 tons of cargo in Sicily by the end of July. The Eight Army did equally well landing “66,000 personnel, 10,000 vehicles and 60,000 tons of supplies” on the initial wave with no problems sustaining the force through the operation. While struggling with the joint functions of C2 and movement and maneuver in HUSKY, Allied sustainment was a success at the operational level. “Sicily was a victory for the
Eisenhower was the Allied Commander in Chief for HUSKY. His principle deputies were all British. Admiral Cunningham commanded naval forces. Air Marshal Tedder commanded air forces. General Alexander was dual-hatted as Eisenhower’s deputy and the ground forces commander. Montgomery and Patton each commanded a joint task force under Alexander. The geographic separation of the key decision makers and the commander’s preoccupation with current operations in North Africa hampered planning for HUSKY. The lack of active leadership from either Eisenhower or Alexander during the planning process debilitated the process resulting in “near paralysis over HUSKY.” This lack of leadership allowed inter-Allied and inter-service rivalries prevalent during the Africa campaign to continue during HUSKY planning. The safe dispersion of the fleet was Cunningham’s primary concern, while Tedder fixated on capturing airfields for his aircraft. Montgomery insisted on concentrating ground forces for mutual support. Eisenhower’s tendency to “rule on plans developed by his staff” rather than provide definitive guidance, left a leadership vacuum. Montgomery finally proposed an invasion plan acceptable to all, first outlined to Bedell Smith on a latrine mirror. Eisenhower and Alexander accepted Montgomery’s plan to concentrate the Allied landings in southeastern Sicily, drive inland to capture airfields and …show more content…
“Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until mission accomplishment.” Effective sustainment allows the commander flexibility and operational reach to “seize, retain and exploit the initiative.” HUSKY, the largest amphibious operation of the war was a huge logistical challenge. Allied planners estimated Allied forces required 6,000 tons of supplies per day. A U.S. Navy action report in 1943 asserted “constant and harmonious planning” between the Allied joint force occurred to deal with the logistical challenges. The Allies learned from amphibious operations in Africa and developed new sustainment organizations and equipment for HUSKY, including “Base Sections” (a sustainment element) and the new amphibious DUKW transport. The Seventh Army landed 11,824 men, 21,512 vehicles and 104,734 tons of cargo in Sicily by the end of July. The Eight Army did equally well landing “66,000 personnel, 10,000 vehicles and 60,000 tons of supplies” on the initial wave with no problems sustaining the force through the operation. While struggling with the joint functions of C2 and movement and maneuver in HUSKY, Allied sustainment was a success at the operational level. “Sicily was a victory for the