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This implied a thrust that entailed total leadership commitment and a massive mobilization of the nations resources[4] which ultimately destroyed living standards in the rural areas through forced abortion and abuse of women. The consequences of the One Child Policy were that there would be a significant increase in the dependency rate of the elderly over the next 25-30 years, there would be a large gender imbalance and the Chinese working class would eventually grow old and ‘expire.' It is believed that a more liberal policy may have been more effective in tackling China’s demographic problems. Under the assumption that deriving such a policy in China was a more liberal process, we will evaluate an alternative to the One Child Policy and examine its implications by applying Mancur Olsen’s theory of the collective action
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In this case, the groups affected by the implementation of the two-child policy are extremely large and take up a significant portion of the Chinese population. Because the groups are so extremely large, Olson draws upon the problem of the ‘free rider.' The problem of the ‘free rider’ states that because group benefits are usually inherently shared, the individual benefit from the collective action cannot be privatized - therefore motivating individual members with common interests to ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of others in obtaining the collective goal. In this case, the collective goal is the implementation of the two-child policy, which will holistically benefit the masses that are involved in the advocation against the one-child policy. Olson’s theory shows that the problem of the ‘free rider’ is especially highly influential in social movements as it problematizes mobilization of the group. Therefore, collective action cannot be assumed to flow from common interests. Stemming from the problem of the ‘free rider’ Olson’s theory addresses the efficacy of the large organizational unit. Marginal contribution being minute may be since the probability of ‘making a difference’ is extremely small whereby individuals believe that their effort will not make a significant difference to the production and availability of the public good. In such a case, where there is a large organizational unit motivating the commencement of a two-child policy - monitoring the marginal contribution is difficult and near impossible whilst the marginal contribution is very likely to be
In this case, the groups affected by the implementation of the two-child policy are extremely large and take up a significant portion of the Chinese population. Because the groups are so extremely large, Olson draws upon the problem of the ‘free rider.' The problem of the ‘free rider’ states that because group benefits are usually inherently shared, the individual benefit from the collective action cannot be privatized - therefore motivating individual members with common interests to ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of others in obtaining the collective goal. In this case, the collective goal is the implementation of the two-child policy, which will holistically benefit the masses that are involved in the advocation against the one-child policy. Olson’s theory shows that the problem of the ‘free rider’ is especially highly influential in social movements as it problematizes mobilization of the group. Therefore, collective action cannot be assumed to flow from common interests. Stemming from the problem of the ‘free rider’ Olson’s theory addresses the efficacy of the large organizational unit. Marginal contribution being minute may be since the probability of ‘making a difference’ is extremely small whereby individuals believe that their effort will not make a significant difference to the production and availability of the public good. In such a case, where there is a large organizational unit motivating the commencement of a two-child policy - monitoring the marginal contribution is difficult and near impossible whilst the marginal contribution is very likely to be