The earliest of these attempts is the Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite Act of 2008. Sponsored by Senator Sam Brownback (R- Kansas), this act required the President to formulate a list of armed groups in the DRC that commit human rights violations, as well as sought to completely ban the importation of minerals that benefit said groups. The bill also proposed civil and criminal penalties for those who violated it. Although the bill garnered a fair amount of support, it died in committee at the end of the 110th Congress. At the beginning of the 111th congress in 2009, Representative Jim McDermott (D – Washington) proposed the Conflict Minerals Trade Act, which suggested that the U.S. Government identify commercial goods that could contain conflict minerals, approve a list of independent groups qualified to monitor the processing of these goods, and eventually restrict the importation of goods to those from audited facilities. Similar to the Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite Act before it, the Conflict Minerals Trade Act also recommended civil and criminal penalties for those who violated it. Unfortunately (and also similar to the Conflict Coltan Act), the bill died in …show more content…
One such consequence is a “de facto embargo” by U.S. companies in regards to Congolese conflict minerals. In many ways, it is easier to forego DRC minerals and, thus, forego fulfilling the extensive requirements imposed by Section 1502, by finding different sources of said minerals (like in Southeast Asia, where requirements are more lax). This “de facto embargo”, coupled with a subsequent yearlong mining moratorium implemented by President Joseph Kabila, has costed hundreds of thousands of artisanal miners their already meager subsistence. Years of continuous conflict has rendered jobs in the agricultural sector all but useless as farmers are consistently attacked and looted by armed groups. Many Congolese turn to mining to make a living – a lack of other occupational options makes the “de facto embargo” all the more