B. National Labor Relations Act Remedies and the Judicial System
The NLRB is limited to remedial punishments, and the American courts have continuously ruled that the NLRA “is designed to perform a remedies function and that punitive sanctions may not be imposed for violations.” The court system’s focus on these remedial limitations has also affected those measures recognized to be within the Board’s power. The courts have questioned such remedies as back pay orders, reinstatement orders, and bargaining orders, as well as limited the Board’s remedial power when other legislation comes into play in Board charges. Overall, labor law in general, especially those specifically enforced by the NLRB have had an antagonistic relationship with …show more content…
Why the National Labor Relation Act’s Remedies Do Not Work
Currently the remedies available under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) are purely remedial and do not adequately protect the rights of workers, and “[a]s a result, a culture of near impunity has taken shape in much of U.S. labor law . . . labor law enforcement often fails to deter unlawful conduct. When the law is applied, enervating delays and weak remedies invite continued …show more content…
Indeed, many have pointed out that the lack of punitive damages or fines, makes it a smart business decision for the employer to commit a ULP, “it is that an employer's quite business-like calculation of cost and benefit counsels, even if their lawyers are constrained by ethical considerations, that risking findings of illegal conduct” is worth deterring employee collective activity. For example, studies of 8(a)(3) violations have found that the average remedy against an employer who is found guilty of violating the NLRA is between $3,000 and $15,000, but the average savings to employers for committing these ULPS is well over $300,000. This holds true for other ULP violations as well. Rationally, employers have no economic incentive with the current NLRA remedies to not commit ULPs, although deterrence theory suggests, “that it makes more sense from the regulator’s perspective to increase penalties . .
The NLRB is limited to remedial punishments, and the American courts have continuously ruled that the NLRA “is designed to perform a remedies function and that punitive sanctions may not be imposed for violations.” The court system’s focus on these remedial limitations has also affected those measures recognized to be within the Board’s power. The courts have questioned such remedies as back pay orders, reinstatement orders, and bargaining orders, as well as limited the Board’s remedial power when other legislation comes into play in Board charges. Overall, labor law in general, especially those specifically enforced by the NLRB have had an antagonistic relationship with …show more content…
Why the National Labor Relation Act’s Remedies Do Not Work
Currently the remedies available under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) are purely remedial and do not adequately protect the rights of workers, and “[a]s a result, a culture of near impunity has taken shape in much of U.S. labor law . . . labor law enforcement often fails to deter unlawful conduct. When the law is applied, enervating delays and weak remedies invite continued …show more content…
Indeed, many have pointed out that the lack of punitive damages or fines, makes it a smart business decision for the employer to commit a ULP, “it is that an employer's quite business-like calculation of cost and benefit counsels, even if their lawyers are constrained by ethical considerations, that risking findings of illegal conduct” is worth deterring employee collective activity. For example, studies of 8(a)(3) violations have found that the average remedy against an employer who is found guilty of violating the NLRA is between $3,000 and $15,000, but the average savings to employers for committing these ULPS is well over $300,000. This holds true for other ULP violations as well. Rationally, employers have no economic incentive with the current NLRA remedies to not commit ULPs, although deterrence theory suggests, “that it makes more sense from the regulator’s perspective to increase penalties . .